Functions in Jurisprudential Methodology

Abstract

This paper guides the reader through the use of functions in contemporary legal philosophy: in\ud developing those philosophies and through methodological debates over their proper role. This\ud paper is broken into two sections. In the first I canvass the role of functions in the legal philosophies\ud of several mid to late twentieth century Anglo-American general jurisprudents whose\ud theories are still common topics of discussion: Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart, Lon L. Fuller, John\ud Finnis, and Joseph Raz. In the second, I examine contemporary arguments over the role of functions\ud in the methodology of legal philosophy

Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence

“…Specifically, it conveys the ability to create desire-independent reasons for oneself and others, i.e., the ability to impose duties and obligations (Searle 2010, 85). For an overview of the use of functions in general jurisprudence, see Ehrenberg (2013). For example, "The person who wins the Electoral College vote counts as the President of the United States in all legal and governmental contexts after taking the Oath of Office."…”