Frontline Worker Discretion in the For‐Profit Banking Industry: Lessons From Early Pandemic Relief Programming

Abstract

In April and May 2020, the United States banking industry approved over $650 billion in federal relief funds as part of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). Since then, extensive evidence of discriminatory lending has been revealed by investigative journalism and academic studies. Our study is based on 41 interviews with frontline banking professionals conducted during the days and weeks of the PPP rollout. We find that under the crisis conditions of the pandemic, capped funds in the PPP and built‐in incentives that encouraged certain types of loans, banking employees relied upon the professional norms and logic of the for‐profit sector. We argue that these norms and logics threatened the integrity of the PPP as a public relief programme by applying profit‐oriented priorities to resources marked for universal and fair distribution. Our findings offer new directions for theorising sector‐level differences in street‐level bureaucratic discretion in the context of mixed‐sector collaboration on public service delivery, particularly under conditions of crisis and urgency.