From the War of the Pacific to 1930

Blakemore, Harold; Bethell, Leslie

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609503.003

Cited by 14 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…The traditional landed elite opposed the reforms and overthrew Alessandri in a coup in 1924. Back in power after a countercoup in 1925, Alessandri went ahead with constitutional reforms granting voting rights to the majority of the male population, decreasing the power of the traditional landed oligarchy, and supporting labor unionism, in addition to proposing economic reforms aimed at replacing the existing model with a new one based on industrial protectionism (Blakemore, ). The economic crisis generated by the Great Depression and the ensuing political turmoil consolidated the consensus around these reforms, permitting Alessandri to go in full force with them after returning to power in 1932.…”

Section: Historical Evolution Of the Chilean Institutional Environmenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political connections, the liability of foreignness, and legitimacy: A business historical analysis of multinationals’ strategies in Chile

Bucheli

Salvaj

2018

Global Strategy Journal

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Research Summary: We conduct a historical analysis of the multinational corporations’ strategy of creating connections with a host country’s elite as a way of legitimizing its operations in contexts characterized by long‐term political, social, and economic changes. We argue that the success or failure of these strategies depends on (a) the perceived legitimacy of these connections among a host country’s society during times of change and (b) the capability of the multinational’s political connections to shield it from challenges arising when the host country’s social structure is undergoing deep transformations. We outline and follow a business historical approach that combines the theoretical frameworks of international business, strategy, organizational theory, and political science to analyze multinationals operating in Chile’s energy and telecommunications sectors from 1932 to 1973. Managerial Summary: Western multinationals face hard challenges when trying to legitimize their operations vis‐à‐vis the host country’s societies in emerging and underdeveloped countries. One strategy developed by multinationals to neutralize potential challenges to their legitimacy has been to establish connections with influential members of the host country’s elites. We study how this strategy fares in host countries that are undergoing dramatic political and economic changes. We first argue that overtly maintaining open connections with an elite that is viewed as a relic of an illegitimate past can become a liability. And, second, that highly visible connections are more likely to become a liability in times of political and social change than less visible ones. We illustrate our arguments with a historical study of the strategies followed by American telecommunications and oil multinationals in Chile.

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Section: Historical Evolution Of the Chilean Institutional Environmenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political connections, the liability of foreignness, and legitimacy: A business historical analysis of multinationals’ strategies in Chile

Bucheli

Salvaj

2018

Global Strategy Journal

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“…And indeed, even the traditional hacienda system in Chile always had a substantial migratory and seasonal component (afuerinos) that provided supplemental labor during harvest periods. 81 To be sure, this set of productive relations did not facilitate agricultural modernization in the way either capitalist or small-farmer systems would, but it was consonant with substantial improvements in the efficacy of the central government.…”

Section: Why Is the Chilean State So Effective?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Social Foundations of Institutional Order: Reconsidering War and the “Resource Curse” in Third World State Building

Kurtz

2009

Politics & Society

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This manuscript departs strongly from conventional accounts that ascribe a central role to war and the threat of war in Third World state building. Similarly, it challenges the conventional wisdom that abundant exportable natural resource wealth is likely to provoke institutional atrophy. Instead, it argues that a set of logically prior conditions—the social relations that govern the principal economic sectors and the pattern or intraelite conflict or compromise—launch path-dependent processes that help determine when, and if, either strategic conflict or resource wealth contribute to, or impede, institutional development. The argument is tested in the comparative analysis of the state-building process in two Andean neighbors (Chile and Peru), both of which are situated in similar strategic and natural resource environments but which produced qualitatively different outcomes in terms of state capacity or “strength.”

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“…He lost no time writing a new constitution that decreased the power of the traditional landowning class, gave more power to the urban middle and working classes, supported unionism, and gave the president powers to enlarge the State and protect national industry, marking the beginning of sustained expansion of the State over the next five decades. 36 Despite his alliance with the Left, Alessandri also approached the increasingly powerful Chilean industrial elite, which he considered a crucial player in his ISI project. In his presidential message of 1924, he even praised the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (National Manufacturers Association, or SOFOFA) and gradually started raising protectionist tariffs.…”

Section: Chilean Exceptionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multinational Corporations, Business Groups, and Economic Nationalism: Standard Oil (New Jersey), Royal Dutch-Shell, and Energy Politics in Chile 1913–2005

Bucheli¹

2010

Enterp. soc.

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This article analyzes the long-term strategies employed by multinational oil corporations in a late industrializing country with powerful business groups when faced with economic nationalism. I study the case of Royal Dutch-Shell in Chile from 1913 to 2005, where two oil multinationals controlled 100 percent of the Chilean market until forced by the government to accept a domestic private company, COPEC, into a new three-member cartel. The multinationals accepted this arrangement reluctantly, but in the long term it proved beneficial. COPEC's involvement in Chilean business groups protected the multinationals from hostile actions by the government and gave legitimacy to the cartel. These benefits ended when Chile abandoned its import substitution industrialization strategy in the 1970s.

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From the War of the Pacific to 1930

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Political connections, the liability of foreignness, and legitimacy: A business historical analysis of multinationals’ strategies in Chile

Political connections, the liability of foreignness, and legitimacy: A business historical analysis of multinationals’ strategies in Chile

The Social Foundations of Institutional Order: Reconsidering War and the “Resource Curse” in Third World State Building

Multinational Corporations, Business Groups, and Economic Nationalism: Standard Oil (New Jersey), Royal Dutch-Shell, and Energy Politics in Chile 1913–2005

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