From “the Life of the Present” to the “Icy Slopes of Logic”: Logical Empiricism, the Unity of Science Movement, and the Cold War

Reisch, George A.

doi:10.1017/ccol0521791782.004

Cited by 16 publications

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“…George A. Reisch's (2005) characterization of American philosophy of science before and during the emergence of logical empiricism fits these perspectives. Insofar as an alternative to logical empiricist philosophy of science is identified in recent literature, it is pragmatist philosophy of science (see, e.g., Giere 1996).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…The force of these potential explanations is substantially blunted by our estimate that pragmatists were a minority among speculative philosophers of science. Further, we have seen that the issues that came to dominate analytic philosophy of science were already an integral part of pre-logical empiricist philosophy of science and that, in addition, the speculative component of this A second potential explanation for the rise of logical empiricism is that logical empiricism disengaged from societal and political concerns by the 1950s and thus, unlike pragmatism, was well placed to thrive when conservatives were putting political pressure on the left during the McCarthy era (McCumber 2001;Reisch 2005). We accept that this too may have been a factor in the decline of speculative philosophy of science, especially given that speculative philosophy of science was intimately tied to value-laden projects.…”

Section: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another focus of recent histories of philosophy of science associates the rise of logical empiricism in America with a change in philosophy of science's normative orientation. It has been argued that, from the late 1940s, philosophy of science starts to avoid active engagement with social, political and moral concerns (Howard 2003;Reisch 2005;Douglas 2009). More precisely, the claim is that philosophy of science came increasingly to eschew what we have elsewhere (2019) called 'value-laden approaches to philosophy of science', i.e., approaches that aim to offer empirical descriptions of non-cognitive (social, political, moral) values in science or normatively to appraise aspects of the scientific enterprise using noncognitive values.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science

Katzav¹,

Vaesen²

2022

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

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This paper contributes to explaining the rise of logical empiricism in mid-twentieth century (North) America and to a better understanding of American philosophy of science before the dominance of logical empiricism. We show that, contrary to a number of existing histories, philosophy of science was already a distinct subfield of philosophy, one with its own approaches and issues, even before logical empiricists arrived in America. It was a form of speculative philosophy with a concern for speculative metaphysics, normative issues relating to science and society and issues which later were associated with logical empiricist philosophy of science, issues such as confirmation, scientific explanation, reductionism and laws of nature. Further, philosophy of science was not primarily pragmatist in orientation. We also show, with the help of our historical characterization, that a recent account of the emergence of analytic philosophy applies to the rise of logical empiricism. It has been argued that the emergence of American analytic philosophy is partly explained by analytic philosophers' use of key institutions, including of journals, to marginalize speculative philosophy and promote analytic philosophy. We argue that this use of institutions included the marginalization of speculative and value-laden philosophy of science and the promotion of logical empiricism.Acknowledgements: we would like to thank the paper's anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science

Katzav¹,

Vaesen²

2022

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

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“…53 A moral na Encyclopedia, diferentemente, não é tarefa da religião, mas da ciência, como tratado por Dewey ([1939Dewey ([ ] 1970. Embora haja controvérsias sobre a posição dos integrantes do Círculo de Viena a respeito da ética e da moral, é certo que eles não reservaram tal área à religião (REISCH, 2007). Neurath menciona a possibilidade de estender a atitude científica até disciplinas tradicionalmente filosóficas, como a ética e a estética (NEURATH, [1937), e Carnap afirma posteriormente que o jeito mais adequado de tratar dos problemas éticos é da maneira proposta por Dewey (CARNAP, 1963 54 "Nous ne lui reprocherons point d'avoir confondu la culture de l'esprit avec l'abus qu'on en peut faire; il nous répondrait sans doute que cet abus en est inséparable".…”

Section: Acta Scientiarum Human and Social Sciencesunclassified

<b>Mosaicos enciclopédicos: Neurath e d’Alembert sobre ciência e demarcação

Cunha

2015

Acta Sci. Human Soc. Sci.

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RESUMO.Este artigo compara os projetos enciclopédicos de Neurath e de d'Alembert no que diz respeito ao conceito de ciência adotado e à maneira como a ciência se distingue do obscurantismo. Neurath, em acordo com o proposto pelo Círculo de Viena, concebe a ciência como uma atitude, uma concepção de mundo, que direciona os esforços humanos para a solução de problemas por meio da experiência vivida. D'Alembert, seguindo a tendência do iluminismo francês, toma a ciência em continuidade com a filosofia e em oposição ao abuso de práticas dogmáticas. Encontra-se, nas duas enciclopédias, o estímulo ao esclarecimento e à precisão de conceitos. Isso se reflete na luta política dos dois grupos de enciclopedistas.Palavras-chave: Círculo de Viena, iluminismo, enciclopedismo, filosofia da ciência. Encyclopedic Mosaics: Neurath and d'Alembert on Science and DemarcationABSTRACT. This paper compares the encyclopedic projects of Neurath and of d'Alembert as to the concept of science that is adopted, and to the way science is distinguished from obscurantism. Neurath, in accordance with Vienna Circle proposals, conceives science as an attitude, a world-conception, which directs human efforts towards the solution of problems by means of lived experience. D'Alembert, following the French Enlightenment tendency, takes science as continuous with philosophy, and in opposition to the abuse of dogmatic practices. In both encyclopedias, the stimulus to clarification and to the precision of concepts is found. This reflects on the political struggle of the two encyclopedic groups. A tendência predominante entre os filósofos da ciência deste início de século XXI é considerar que este problema não pode ser solucionado, que a ciência se desenvolveu historicamente como uma variedade de atividades que têm pouco em comum. Argumentamos em outro texto, porém, que o tratamento de Neurath ao problema, que veremos abaixo, oferece uma resposta aos desafios mais recentes (CUNHA, 2015a). 3 Procuraremos discutir esses dois problemas, deixando de lado aquela que é, talvez, a diferença mais marcante entre essas duas enciclopédias: a Encyclopédie é um dicionário dos fundamentos de diversas atividades, ao passo que a Encyclopedia é um compêndio de filosofia da ciência.

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“….' 74 ). Structure was conceived as part of James Conant's programme of General Education in which Conant wished to promote a concept of science as a historical activity.…”

Section: Knowledge and Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge communities in Europe from the Renaissance through the Cold War

Lubenow¹

2006

Interdisciplinary Science Reviews

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This article examines Karl Mannheim's famous characterisation of the organisers of knowledge as an ‘unanchored relatively classless stratum’. It looks closely at Ficino's Florentine Academy, Cesi's Accademia dei Lincei, the authors of the Encyclopédie, William Whewell and his circle at Cambridge, G. H. Hardy and the London Mathematical Society, Sartre and French intellectuals in the 1940s and 50s, and finally Thomas Kuhn and the Society of Fellows at Harvard, to show that knowledge is relational. It describes the social characteristics of knowledge communities, the kinds of knowledge they organise, and the relations of knowledge communities to centres of power.

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From “the Life of the Present” to the “Icy Slopes of Logic”: Logical Empiricism, the Unity of Science Movement, and the Cold War

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science

The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science

<b>Mosaicos enciclopédicos: Neurath e d’Alembert sobre ciência e demarcação

Knowledge communities in Europe from the Renaissance through the Cold War

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