2017 IEEE 25th International Requirements Engineering Conference Workshops (REW) 2017
DOI: 10.1109/rew.2017.36
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From Requirements to Operation: Components for Risk Assessment in a Pervasive System of Systems

Abstract: Abstract-Framing Internet of Things (IoT) applications as a System of Systems (SoS) can help us make sense of complexity associated with interoperability and emergence. However, assessing the risk of SoSs is a challenge due to the independence of component systems, and their differing degrees of control and emergence. This paper presents three components for SoS risk assessment that integrate with existing risk assessment approaches: Human System Integration (HSI), Interoperability identification and analysis,… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(8 citation statements)
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References 28 publications
(26 reference statements)
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“…Through our research [19] [37], it has also become evident that use of a common less-technical language of security and risk can assist multi-level stakeholder understanding. Moreover, it is useful for operational stakeholders to first align with the concept of SoSs before its complexity can be identified and appreciated.…”
Section: Approachmentioning
confidence: 97%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Through our research [19] [37], it has also become evident that use of a common less-technical language of security and risk can assist multi-level stakeholder understanding. Moreover, it is useful for operational stakeholders to first align with the concept of SoSs before its complexity can be identified and appreciated.…”
Section: Approachmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Therefore, Sommerville et al [17] argue a system's components and their relationships need to be thoroughly understood, otherwise predictions cannot be made as the scale and complexity increases. Typical examples of SoSs may range from larger-scale military operations, to smaller examples with fewer direct stakeholders [18] [19]. For example, the Smartphone is a common system integrated into personal and work environments that could be considered a SoS.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another set of manual approaches [27] describing MS STRIDE and DREAD application for risk modelling is also lacking automation characteristic. CAIRIS method [28] is based on the evaluation of the context, goals, boundaries, stakeholders, scope and risk criteria.…”
Section: Dynamic and Automated Cybersecurity Risk Assessmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using this output with other SoS information, this provided an opportunity to integrate the use of tool-support, testing the feasibility of CAIRIS to model the SoS and its human interactions to identify and address challenges to security risk and requirements within the SoS. Further details of this work can be found in [2].…”
Section: B Towards Rq2 and Rq3mentioning
confidence: 99%