Abstract:According to relational egalitarians, equality is not primarily about the distribution of some good but about people relating to one another as equals. However, compared with other theorists in political philosophy – including other egalitarians – relational egalitarians have said relatively little on what role personal responsibility should play in their theories. For example, is equality compatible with responsibility? Should economic distributions be responsibility-sensitive? This article fills this gap. I … Show more
“…31. See, for example, (Anderson, 1999;Bengtson and Lippert-Rasmussen, 2023;Fourie et al, 2015;Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018;Schemmel, 2021;Schmidt, 2021) 32. The situation becomes more complex, as several non-consequentialist theories also comprise views about intergenerational obligations that might entail a duty to reduce existential risk (also, see Ord, 2020: 2).…”
Section: Orcid Idmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 31. See, for example, (Anderson, 1999; Bengtson and Lippert-Rasmussen, 2023; Fourie et al, 2015; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018; Schemmel, 2021; Schmidt, 2021)…”
Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal consequences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality's intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity's (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations and so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality's short-term consequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality.
“…31. See, for example, (Anderson, 1999;Bengtson and Lippert-Rasmussen, 2023;Fourie et al, 2015;Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018;Schemmel, 2021;Schmidt, 2021) 32. The situation becomes more complex, as several non-consequentialist theories also comprise views about intergenerational obligations that might entail a duty to reduce existential risk (also, see Ord, 2020: 2).…”
Section: Orcid Idmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 31. See, for example, (Anderson, 1999; Bengtson and Lippert-Rasmussen, 2023; Fourie et al, 2015; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2018; Schemmel, 2021; Schmidt, 2021)…”
Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal consequences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality's intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity's (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations and so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality's short-term consequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality.
“…As stated by Hungerford and Volk (1990) and Hines et al (1987), individual responsibility to a problem or an active approach signifies the level to which people recognise problems, reflecting a sense of possession or own interest in the issue. Personal responsibility is rooted in relational egalitarianism, which explains why certain distributions should be sensitive to personal responsibility and choice (Schmidt, 2021). Bardwell (1991) stated that the active participation of people be determined by various causes, such as how someone grasped and reacts to the problem (concern), whether someone believes that he/she is capable of undertaking the problem (competence), what would a person do if he or she had an idea or alternative (imagery).…”
Section: Personal Responsibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As stated by Hungerford and Volk (1990) and Hines et al (1987), individual responsibility to a problem or an active approach signifies the level to which people recognise problems, reflecting a sense of possession or own interest in the issue. Personal responsibility is rooted in relational egalitarianism, which explains why certain distributions should be sensitive to personal responsibility and choice (Schmidt, 2021).…”
Purpose
Within a few days, the National Disaster Management Agency’s COVID-19 Fund (NADMA) has collected RM 5.5 m in donations from individuals and companies. These data shows that voluminous Malaysians are willing to help although they are in a difficult situation. Grounded in the Social Responsibility theory, this paper aims to examine the factors that motivate infaq (donation) behaviour in Malaysia during Movement Control Order (MCO).
Design/methodology/approach
The quantitative questionnaire survey method was used to obtain the data. This research’s unit analysis was of individuals who had done any help during COVID-19 MCO in Malaysia. The respondents were from all states in Malaysia, 20 years old and above and constituted of all races.
Findings
Although the religiosity factor did not play a significant role as a moderator, the results of the study found that all factors from the social responsibility theory had a significant positive relationship to Infaq behaviour during an emergency.
Practical implications
Identifying the vital driving factors that determine the infaq offer makes it possible for fundraisers to entirely focus on developing better approaches that can increase the role that these driving factors can play and possibly improve the impact on those previously unaffected factors.
Originality/value
From the authors’ knowledge, the research paper on helping effort during an emergency is minimal, let alone the research on infaq behaviour. This paper’s originality lies in the relationship between infaq behaviour, emergency and social responsibility theory which has never been explored before by other researchers.
“…A great deal has now been written on relational egalitarianism. Prominent works includeAnderson 1999;Bidadanure 2016;Fourie 2012; Fourie et al 2015;Hojlund 2022;Kolodny 2014;Lippert-Rasmussen 2018, 2021a, 2021bMcTernan 2018;Miller 1998;Nath 2011Nath , 2020Satz 2010;Scanlon 2018;Scheffler 2003Scheffler , 2005Scheffler , 2015Schemmel 2012Schemmel , 2021Schmidt 2022;Tomlin 2014;Viehoff 2014Viehoff , 2019Voigt 2018;Wilson 2019;Wolff 1998; Young 1990. 12 For instance, according to luck egalitarianism, individuals' distributive positions should reflect only their relative exercise of responsibility; Lippert-Rasmussen 2015.…”
When discussing theories of justice, most philosophers take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point. As Will Kymlicka says, in all contemporary plausible theories of justice, moral equality constitutes an "egalitarian plateau". 1 Arguably, the most prominent novel theory of justice in recent years is relational egalitarianism-a theory on which justice requires people to relate as equals. Relational egalitarians are no exception to Kymlicka's claim. They too start from the idea of moral equality. As one of us previously put it, "as a matter of fact, we are one another's moral equals and in relating as equals we honour that fact, and this is what grounds the ideal of relational egalitarianism". 2 Awkwardly, given this near-consensus, it has proved difficult to identify the properties in virtue of which all human beings, or at least those who are persons, are moral equals. Richard Arneson sums up the problem nicely:Either the proposed basis [the property, or properties, proposed to ground equal moral status] will turn out to vary by degree, and variations above the claimed threshold that establishes equality will give rise to inequality of moral considerability, or the proposed basis will turn out to be one that applies in an all-or-nothing fashion, and then it will turn out that the basis proposed as justifying equal moral considerability is too flimsy or insubstantial to do this justifying work. 3 1 Kymlicka 2002. But see Lippert-Rasmussen (2022a) on why this is confusing in the context of utilitarianism.
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