From radio to radar: Interwar military adaptation to technological change in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States

Beyerchen, Alan

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511601019.008

Cited by 7 publications

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“…Radio also enabled the Kriegsmarine to direct U-boats to intercept Allied convoys in the vast Atlantic. To establish and maintain this connectivity, German forces needed compatible radios, a common language and shared communication doctrine (Beyerchen, 1996). German units cooperated with each other to establish connectivity because they had a mutual interest in coordinating military activity.…”

Section: The Social Life Of Cryptologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Abducted by hackers: Using the case of Bletchley Park to construct a theory of intelligence performance that generalizes to cybersecurity

Lindsay

2024

Journal of Peace Research

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Most cyber intrusions are a form of intelligence rather than warfare, but intelligence remains undertheorized in international relations (IR). This article develops a theory of intelligence performance at the operational level, which is where technology is most likely to affect broader political and military outcomes. It uses the pragmatic method of abduction to bootstrap general theory from the historical case of Bletchley Park in World War II. This critical case of computationally enabled signals intelligence anticipates important later developments in cybersecurity. Bletchley Park was uncommonly successful due to four conditions drawn from contemporary practice of cryptography: radio networks provided connectivity; German targets created vulnerability; Britain invested in bureaucratic organization; and British personnel exercised discretion. The method of abduction is used to ground these particular conditions in IR theory, revisit the evaluation of the case, and consider historical disanalogies. The result is a more generalizable theory that can be applied to modern cybersecurity as well as traditional espionage. The overarching theme is that intelligence performance in any era depends on institutional context more than technological sophistication. The political distinctiveness of intelligence practice, in contrast to war or coercive diplomacy, is deceptive competition between rival institutions in a cooperatively constituted institutional environment. Because cyberspace is highly institutionalized, furthermore, intelligence contests become pervasive in cyberspace.

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Section: The Social Life Of Cryptologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Abducted by hackers: Using the case of Bletchley Park to construct a theory of intelligence performance that generalizes to cybersecurity

Lindsay

2024

Journal of Peace Research

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“…During World War I, Germany's use of the radio permitted simultaneous transmission of commands to multiple units to avoid bottlenecks and delays caused by telegraph relays or telephone switching stations. 20 IT can also eliminate intermediaries as evidenced by the US navy's proposed Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) offering all users a common picture of the battle space. The wireless performed a disintermediating role by allowing data to flow directly between the Admiralty and units at sea, eliminating the need to pass through squadron and theater commanders.…”

Section: It and Military Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: Information Resources and Military Performance

Goldman¹

2004

Journal of Strategic Studies

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Dramatic advances in telecommunications and data processing, collectively known as information technology, lend credence to the idea that we are in the midst of an 'information-based Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)'. The exploitation of advances in information technology is producing greater knowledge, and when linked with precision weaponry, is transforming the way wars are fought by the world's leading military powers. Strategic thinkers and security experts have been discussing and debating the impact of information technology on military operations and warfare ever since the late 1970s when Soviet General Nikolai Ogarkov argued that a range of recent innovations would become as important to waging war as nuclear weapons. These innovations included new kinds of explosives, precision-guided weaponry, advances in C 3 I (command, control, communications and intelligence), sensor technology and automated control systems, and weapons based on new physical principles (e.g., particle beams and lasers). 1 US high-tech weapons in the 1991 Gulf War, particularly the unprecedented integration of precision-guided munitions and C 4 I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence), seemed to confirm that an RMA was underway. By linking advances in precision weapons, surveillance satellites, computer-based information processing and organizational changes that network military units, this information RMA could provide greater efficiency and flexibility, and fewer risks of casualties through the use of more highly-skilled troops and smart technologies. 2 Most discussions of the current RMA focus on the central role played by information technology (IT) and its potential to contribute to an RMA when combined with tactical, doctrinal and organizational innovations. A vast literature on the RMA cites the important -indeed dominant -role that IT is playing in contemporary military innovations that have dramatically increased US military performance. Recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the technological prowess of the US military. In the Afghan campaign, SOF-directed precision airpower was a crucial component of rapid success, particularly in combination with ground forces. 3 The US military was able to project power over vast distances with relatively small numbers of troops. The war in Iraq provided a laboratory to test the 'hightech low numbers-on-the-ground' strategy of RMA proponents, which proved extremely effective in the conventional combat phase of the conflict.Yet IT is only one of several 'information resources' that have shaped, and are reshaping, the ways wars are fought. The purpose of these papers is to examine the relationship between information and RMAs. Important distinctions need to be made between the concepts of information, IT and information resources. By failing to make these distinctions and keep them in mind, we run two risks: first, underestimating and not fully appreciating the ways that information influences RMAs; second, overestimating the uniquely informationa...

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Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological Warfare?

Danzig¹

1997

JAMA

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From radio to radar: Interwar military adaptation to technological change in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Abducted by hackers: Using the case of Bletchley Park to construct a theory of intelligence performance that generalizes to cybersecurity

Abducted by hackers: Using the case of Bletchley Park to construct a theory of intelligence performance that generalizes to cybersecurity

Introduction: Information Resources and Military Performance

Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological Warfare?

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