From Philosophical Theology to Democratic Theory

Reidy, David A.

doi:10.1002/9781118328460.ch1

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Fourth, you examine as many leading moral and political theories as possible, in order to see if any further refinement can be achieved, and by doing so achieve wide reflective equilibrium (Pogge, 2007b: 165). Fifth, if everybody in society achieves wide reflective equilibrium on the same set of principles, then we have achieved, not just general reflective equilibrium, given that we agree, but also full reflective equilibrium, given that we agree for the right reasons – that is, in virtue of our wide reflective equilibriums (Lehning, 2009: 124–125; Rawls, 2001: 30–31; Reidy, 2014: 23).…”

Section: The Context Core and Continuity Of Rawls’ Methodsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…5 And it was on this method that his own work was centred, just as contemporary scholarship is centred upon it. It is, we should see, both the core of his project and the idea on which he was working from the very start of his career (Lehning, 2009: 5; Rawls, 1999: 1–19; Reidy, 2014: 12–23). Or, as Freeman puts it, justification via reflective equilibrium is not just ‘the most general idea of justification’, but also ‘the framework for understanding those other ideas’ (2007: 29).…”

Section: The Context Core and Continuity Of Rawls’ Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And then? At that point you are finished, for there is ‘no further test available’ (Reidy, 2014: 23). Once we go through the first four stages as individuals, and the fifth as a society, there is nowhere else to turn.…”

Section: The Context Core and Continuity Of Rawls’ Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We turn now to the more general character of justification via reflective equilibrium, and in particular its unappreciated empiricism . Consider here (1) the way in which Rawls aligns our ‘sense of justice’ with our sense of grammar 9 (Audard, 2007: 33; Freeman, 2007: 34; Maffetone, 2010: 145; Pogge, 2007b: 164; Rawls, 1971: 47); (2) the way in which he interprets our ‘moral capacity’ (Freeman, 2007: 37–38; Rawls, 1971: 46), understood as an aspect of our psychology (Graham, 2007: 130; Rawls, 1999: 289–290); (3) the way in which considered judgements function as empirical ‘facts’ (Freeman, 2007: 31; Laden, 2014: 130; Lehning, 2009: 14; Rawls, 1971: 51; Reidy, 2014: 20) that can be used ‘scientifically’ (Audard, 2007: 130–131) – and with reference to Goodman’s work on induction (Audard, 2007: 33; Maffetone, 2010: 143) – in order to both ‘falsify’ flawed ‘theories’ of justice and ‘discover’ better ones (Audard, 2007: 130–131); and (4) the way those theories both ‘explain’ the judgements we already have and ‘predict’ the new ones we ought to adopt (Rawls, 1971: 104, 425; Reidy, 2014: 12–14). What does all this show us?…”

Section: The Empiricism Of This Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Clearly, that question cannot be answered here. 13 Instead, it will suffice to note two things: (1) Rawls certainly thought enough consistency was available at the start (Reidy, 2014: 20), middle (Rawls, 1999: 306) and end of his career (Rawls, 2005: 14–15), though of course the precise amount of postulated consistency is reduced in Political Liberalism , as noted above; and (2) he only requires enough consistency across our considered judgements – he does not, for example, worry about meta-ethical convictions, for they are not part of the process.…”

Section: The Problems Of This Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rawls’ methodological blueprint

Floyd

2015

European Journal of Political Theory

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Rawls' primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the 'original position' and an 'overlapping consensus'. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given that it turns facts about the thoughts in our head into principles for the regulation of our political existence. Fourth, we miss some of the implications of that empiricism, including its tension with moral realism, relativism, and conservatism.

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Section: The Context Core and Continuity Of Rawls’ Methodsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: The Context Core and Continuity Of Rawls’ Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Context Core and Continuity Of Rawls’ Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Empiricism Of This Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problems Of This Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Rawls’ methodological blueprint

Floyd

2015

European Journal of Political Theory

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The Spiritual Exercises of John Rawls

Lefebvre

2021

Political Theory

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In this article I interpret John Rawls’s concept of the original position as a spiritual exercise. In addition to the standard interpretation of the original position as an expository device to select principles of justice for the fundamental institutions of society, I argue that Rawls also envisages it as a “spiritual exercise”: a voluntary personal practice intended to bring about a transformation of the self. To make this argument, I draw on the work of Pierre Hadot, a philosopher and classicist, who introduced the idea of spiritual exercises as central to ancient and modern conceptions of philosophy. By reading Rawls alongside Hadot, this article portrays Rawls as a thinker deeply concerned with the question of how subjects can lead more just and fulfilling lives. It also proposes that the original position as a spiritual exercise can help defend liberalism as a social and political doctrine.

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For a Society Beyond Justice

Lele

2020

Psychology and Developing Societies

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The first part of the paper suggests a minimalist framework for integrating the discipline of psychology. Such a framework must rest on the principle of parsimony, build on fewest and simplest possible axiomatic assumptions and yet be able to contain, sustain and benefit from the enormous diversity of its interests and approaches, its ever-widening research enterprise and its unique relationship to neuroscience that situates it felicitously between natural and human sciences. I take the Kantian questions about the human condition as the starting point to link the concepts of reason, work and autonomy to the idea of self as transformative agency that straddles the domains of nature and society the way psychology does. The second part of the paper takes Rawls’ idea of society beyond justice, with reference Marx, to show why justice must act as the placeholder for equality in formal procedural democracies and to chart the direction that psychology should follow to meet the challenge of becoming more relevant for human welfare in this neoliberal age of deepening inequalities and mounting social, political and personality crises.

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From Philosophical Theology to Democratic Theory

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Rawls’ methodological blueprint

Rawls’ methodological blueprint

The Spiritual Exercises of John Rawls

For a Society Beyond Justice

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