From Neutral Competence to Competent Neutrality? Revisiting Neutral Competence as the Core Normative Foundation of Western Bureaucracy

Hustedt, Thurid; Salomonsen, Heidi Houlberg

doi:10.1108/s0195-631020180000033008

Cited by 17 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Whatever the drivers, these data raise the possibility that in Wellington responsible competence may be eliding into responsive competence. While there is a healthy debate about whether civil servants can be responsive without also being politicized (see Mulgan, 2008;Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2018), the distribution of respondents' sentiment on this issue points to some scepticism that the public service is presently adding its full measure to the policy contest.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From ménage à trois back to pas de deux? Ministerial advisers, civil servants and the contest of policy ideas

Shaw¹,

Eichbaum²

2020

irpp

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The institutionalization of the role of ministerial advisers in most parliamentary democracies has transformed what was once à pas de deux between ministers and senior civil servants into a ménage à trois. This article assesses the impact of ministerial advisers on the contest of policy ideas. It makes a theoretical case for paying closer attention to this issue than has thus far been the case, and assesses civil servants' perceptions of advisers' influence on contestability. The core conclusion, which is at variance with much of the scholarship on ministerial advisers, is that advisers pose a greater threat to policy contestability than to civil service impartiality.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From ménage à trois back to pas de deux? Ministerial advisers, civil servants and the contest of policy ideas

Shaw¹,

Eichbaum²

2020

irpp

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“…The singular interpretation of what constitutes ‘politics’ embedded in this facet of the ‘Westminster syndrome’ (du Gay 2000, p. 141; cited by Hustedt and Salomonsen 2018, p. 74) does not comfortably accommodate Lindblom's central insight that public policy‐making is inherently political rather than rational (Gregory 1999). And that makes it difficult to have sensible conversations regarding functional politicization.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Acknowledging that political indifference is not the solution (nor indeed conceptually possible without cleaving to the unfashionable notion that policy‐making can be value‐free), Hustedt and Salomonsen (2018, p. 79) offer this: ‘thinking politically is not a no‐go for public servants; rather, it is in fact a necessary pre‐condition for doing a good job. Thinking politically does not refer to party politics, however, but rather to navigating through political landscapes for the sake of the government in office.…”

Section: Setting the Theoretical Scene: Responsive And Responsible Comentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The benign narrative that political staff innoculate against the distemper of civil service politicization generates a significant hypothesis, which is that the institutionalization of the partisan role will diminish the incidence of civil service politicization. However, while a smattering of studies assess the association between the agency of political staff and civil service neutrality (Christiansen et al 2016; Öhberg et al 2017; Hustedt and Salomonsen 2018), civil servants' conduct is rarely treated as the independent variable. Consequently, a literature on political staff is being constructed on the assumption that civil service politicization is visited on the bureaucracy from without.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bubbling up or cascading down? Public servants, political advisers and politicization

Shaw

Eichbaum

2020

Public Administration

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One of the strands in the growing scholarship on political advisers in parliamentary democracies proposes that advisers can reduce the risk of civil service politicization by furnishing partisan advice to ministers, freeing civil servants to focus on the provision of expert competence. This benign narrative generates a significant hypothesis, which is that the institutionalization of the partisan role diminishes the risk of civil service politicization. That hypothesis has yet to be fully tested. Several studies have assessed the impact of advisers' actions on civil service impartiality, but the consequences of bureaucrats' own agency for that dependent variable have received far less attention. Drawing on data from a survey of New Zealand public servants, this article challenges the assumption in the political advisers literature that civil service politicization is primarily driven by exogenous factors and calls for a more nuanced theoretical approach to endogenous aspects of politicization.

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“…They strive to act as 'honest brokers' for their ministers' political aims within the limits of factual expertise and consensus orientation. However, German civil servants essentially define their role as experts responsible for a policy field and, in accordance with the Weberian legalistic tradition, as advocates securing the rule-bound implementation of law (Hustedt and Salomonsen 2018). Surveys gathering data on the role definitions of political bureaucrats in the higher ministerial ranks suggest that the bureaucrats perceive themselves as representatives of the state but reject the role of party delegates (Mayntz and Derlien 1989;Schwanke and Ebinger 2006: 243).…”

Section: Coordination and Cooperation: Making Administrative Federalism Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Administrative Federalism

Behnke

Kropp

2021

Governance and Public Management

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The German federal architecture is shaped by a peculiar mix of strong decentralisation and high autonomy at lower levels of government coupled with an administrative culture of uniformity, solidarity and coordination. This system has been described as ‘administrative federalism’ to emphasise the prominent role of executives and administrations in policymaking and policy implementation. The federal level relies on the Länder for executing its tasks; in turn, the Länder executives possess rights of co-decision in federal legislation via the Bundesrat. While formal jurisdictions are strongly decentralised, a dense web of interlocking powers and processes, as well as institutions of coordination, creates incentives for territorial governments to closely cooperate with each other. The German-style administrative federalism has been successful, but is requiring adaptation and developments caused by trends like the upward shift of tasks from the Länder to the federal level and increasing party-system fragmentation.

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From Neutral Competence to Competent Neutrality? Revisiting Neutral Competence as the Core Normative Foundation of Western Bureaucracy

Cited by 17 publications

References 32 publications

From ménage à trois back to pas de deux? Ministerial advisers, civil servants and the contest of policy ideas

From ménage à trois back to pas de deux? Ministerial advisers, civil servants and the contest of policy ideas

Bubbling up or cascading down? Public servants, political advisers and politicization

Administrative Federalism

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