From Market Integration to Core State Powers: The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis and Integration Theory

Abstract

The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU's shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spillover) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero-sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coercive and administrative capacities, and high political salience. We show how these constraints structured the initial design of Economic and Monetary Union and of Schengen, made them vulnerable to crisis, and shaped policy options during the crises: they made horizontal differentiation unattractive, re-regulation ineffective, centralized risk and burden-sharing unfeasible, and the externalization of adjustment burdens to non-EU actors necessary by default. In conclusion, we explore possible escape routes from the trap.

Refugee Students in Spain: The Role of Universities as Sustainable Actors in Institutional Integration

“…These bases could be another useful and effective instrument in the coordination of the reception and integration programs of asylum seekers and refugees [67,68]. This would make it possible to involve civil society, which would help raise awareness, manage the expectations and frustrations of student refugees, and encourage the creation of support networks.…”

“…Third, universities could establish a system of integration indicators and collect data on the refugee population in Spain with minimum standards of integration: language level, how many have left refugee centers and how many have jobs, and in which sectors [67,68]. Knowing the key elements that have led to success and what has been lacking is essential to improve planning and work strategies with this group of students; to establish channels of communication and evaluation so that students can express their opinions about proposals on the issues that concern them.…”

Let Us Europeans Move: How Collective Identities Drive Public Support for Border Regimes inside the EU

“…In contrast, the discussion on the EU's response to the Schengen crisis and Brexit has revolved much more around the role of the collective identities held by European publics. The high public relevance of such identities can be explained by the fact that the nation‐state's monopoly of force for providing public security and determining who belongs to the national community, can be considered a core state power (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, , p. 182). Transnational terrorism, the large influx and secondary movement of migrants in the autumn of 2015, and the subsequent reform debates provide political entrepreneurs with so far unseen historical opportunities to politicize European integration on the matter of border regimes (Börzel and Risse, ).…”

“…During times of crisis ‘identities become salient and are fought over' (Risse, , p. 2). This is particularly true if the crisis is linked to an integrated core state power and solutions for reform suggest further integration (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, , p. 182). Earlier studies on public attitudes towards integration have assessed the relevance of collective identity for attitude formation in different policy areas, such as fiscal or foreign policy (Bechtel et al ., ; Franchino and Segatti, ; Hobolt et al ., ; Irondelle et al ., ; Kentmen, ; Kuhn and Stoeckel, ; Maier and Rittberger, ; Schoen, ).…”

Collective Identity as a Legal Limit to European Integration in Areas of Core State Powers*

“…European integration can take place in areas where no direct legislative competence has been attributed to the EU, including areas that may, upon various definitions, be considered core state powers such as ‘coercive, fiscal or administrative’ powers, as per Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (), policy areas of high salience, following Moravcsik (), such as health, education, social security, taxation and law and order, areas that the Treaty itself states are ‘reserved’ or ‘retained’ by the member states (Azoulai, , de Witte, ), that is, where no competence has been conferred on the Union (Article 4(1) TEU), and that the Treaty considers ‘essential State functions’, such as ‘ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security’ (Article 4(2) TEU). Such ‘competence creep’ (Weatherill, ), has been said to take place particularly through (1) the adoption of indirect legislation on legal bases in the Treaty relating to other policy areas; (2) the disapplication of national provisions that the CJEU finds incompatible with EU treaties, such as, notably, in the internal market, (3) the limitation of national regulatory autonomy through obligations under international trade agreements concluded by the EU; (4) the limitation of national regulatory autonomy through EU policy coordination, such as the European Semester; and (5) parallel action on the borders of the EU framework (Garben, ).…”