From Islamists to Muslim Democrats: The Case of Tunisia’s Ennahda

Grewal, Sharan

doi:10.1017/s0003055419000819

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Other studies have focused specifically on how return migration affects places of origins by fostering local development ( Chauvet et al, 2015 ), entrepreneurship ( Yang, 2008 ) and, more generally, a positive change in attitudes and beliefs (Clingsmith et al. 2009; ( Spilimbergo, 2009 , Chauvet and Mercier, 2014 , Mercier, 2016 , Barsbai et al, 2017 , Grewal, 2020 ). Our results provide a cautionary tale against the potential of migrant networks to improve the welfare of people in places of origin.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internal migration networks and mortality in home communities: Evidence from Italy during the Covid-19 pandemic

Valsecchi

Durante

2021

European Economic Review

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Do internal migration networks benefit or harm their home communities in case of a communicable disease? Looking at the spread of Covid in Italy and using pre-determined province-to-province migration, excess mortality and mobile phone tracking data, we document that provinces with a greater share of migrants in outbreak areas show greater compliance with self-isolation measures (information mechanism), but also a greater population inflow from outbreak areas (carrier mechanism). For a subset of localities, the net effect on mortality is negative . However, for the average locality, the effect is positive and large, suggesting that the role of migrants as information providers is trumped by their role as virus carriers. The effect is quantitatively important and could be incorporated in epidemiological models forecasting the spread of communicable diseases.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internal migration networks and mortality in home communities: Evidence from Italy during the Covid-19 pandemic

Valsecchi

Durante

2021

European Economic Review

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“…But Ennahdha nonetheless experienced significant divisions, especially over whether to include shari'a in the new constitution and whether to bar members of the former regime from holding public office. 6 The government also struggled to deal with a rise in political violence that claimed roots in Islam. Ennahdha was accused of ignoring the emergence of radical voices in the public sphere.…”

Section: The Rise Of Tunisia's Second Republicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transition Arrested

Grubman¹

2022

Journal of Democracy

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His research focuses on party systems, ideology, nostalgia, and corruption during transitions from authoritarian rule, and he is currently working on a book about Tunisia's party system after the 2010-11 uprising.On 25 July 2021, after a day of popular protests against the government, parliament, and largest Islamist party (Ennahdha), Tunisian president Kais Saied invoked Article 80 of the constitution, the emergency clause. Declaring the parliament and government existential threats to the state, he sacked Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, froze parliament's activities for thirty days and stripped its members of immunity, and appointed himself head of the public prosecutor's office. At the end of the thirty days, during which Saied neither named a new prime minister nor agreed to discuss next steps, he extended the exceptional period indefinitely. On September 22, he announced the suspension of parts of the constitution and his assumption of the power to govern by decree.Saied claimed to be acting on behalf of "the people" to restore the promise of a revolution cut short by political elites, their "lobbies" of corruption, and the political parties they supposedly control. It is difficult to gauge precisely how many Tunisians find this argument compelling at a time when speaking out could result in house arrest or a travel ban. Nevertheless, Saied's move against the elected parliament appeared to enjoy broad popular support, at least initially-largely because ten years after ousting their former dictator, most Tunisians were still awaiting the prosperity and good government that democracy was supposed to deliver. And the institutions one might have expected to constrain the president-Ennahdha, the Nobel-prize winning Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the country's robust civil society, and the international actors who have trumpeted the importance of Tunisia's

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“…The Society for Muslim Brothers (jama'at al-ikhwan al-muslimoon), often referred to as the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1929 and is the most influential Islamist movement in the world. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in a period of upheaval in Egypt with the goal of , 2002, 20173 Bahrain 2006, 2014, 20183 Bangladesh 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2008, 2014, 20182 Egypt 2011, 2015, 20204 Indonesia 1999, 2004, 2014, 20195 Jordan 1993, 2003, 2013, 20162 Lebanon 1992, 1996, 2000, 20183 Malaysia 1964, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 2004, 2008, 2013 2002, 20161 Pakistan 1970, 1977, 1988, 1990, 1993, 2002, 2008…”

Section: Identifying Islamist Electoral Successmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The electoral successes of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Tunisia's Ennahda party have become canonical case studies of this process. In both cases, histories of electoral failure and/or exclusion from the political process prompted a recalculation of electoral priorities that included a more full‐throated embrace of democratic norms (Altunisik, 2005; Cavatorta & Merone, 2013; Grewal, 2020; Mecham, 2004; Netterstrøm, 2015). In both cases, the emergence of these more democratic positions coincided with structural opportunities for competitive electoral contests that ultimately brought the newly moderated Islamists into power.…”

Section: “One Person One Vote One Time” and The Development Of A Pess...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reevaluating Islamist electoral success and participation in government

Curtis

2022

Digest Mid East Studies

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Under what conditions will Islamist parties perform well in elections and what happens to the political regime should they gain political power? The canonical hypothesis—“one man, one vote, one time”—argues that Islamist parties are likely to perform well whenever elections become free and that their electoral success is likely to lead to a democratic backslide. Others argue that Islamists are not as popular as this hypothesis suggests or that only moderate Islamist parties are likely to perform well and these parties are unlikely to deliberalize a regime. I propose a modification to these hypotheses, and argue that participation in governments, not seat shares, should be conceptualized as electoral success. Furthermore, because they are often the most likely groups to face repression, the presence of Islamists in governments is indicative of a liberalizing process. Using electoral data from across the Muslim‐majority world, I find that Islamists are more likely to hold cabinet‐level positions as regimes become more competitive and that the presence of Islamists in government has a positive effect on future levels of democracy, broadly defined. These findings suggest a need to reevaluate more critical perspectives on the effect of Islamist participation in democratizing countries in the Muslim‐majority world.

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From Islamists to Muslim Democrats: The Case of Tunisia’s Ennahda

Cited by 18 publications

References 52 publications

Internal migration networks and mortality in home communities: Evidence from Italy during the Covid-19 pandemic

Internal migration networks and mortality in home communities: Evidence from Italy during the Covid-19 pandemic

Transition Arrested

Reevaluating Islamist electoral success and participation in government

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