: From inference to reasoning: The construction of rationality

Moshman, David

doi:10.1080/13546780442000024

Cited by 70 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 57 publications

(72 reference statements)

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“…Studies in which the cylinder and containers tasks have been used have shown that children reason through the application and coordination of logical inferences and that these can be guided by justifiable formal norms (Moshman, 2004). This particularly raises problems for dual-system theories that consign all examples of automatic reasoning to the primary system.…”

Section: Functioningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children’s intuitive reasoning

Osman

Stavy

2006

Psychon Bull Rev

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Section: Functioningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children’s intuitive reasoning

Osman

Stavy

2006

Psychon Bull Rev

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“…What the evidence shows, however, is that facility in evaluating one's own reasoning is a late-developing skill, emerging in late childhood or early adolescence, and then perhaps only as a result of formal instruction [49,50]. This suggests that in order to become competent at monitoring their own reflective reasoning, people must first acquire knowledge of the relevant reasoning norms, and only then are they able to notice shortcomings in their reasoning.…”

Section: Variability In Meta-reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metacognition and reasoning

Fletcher

Carruthers

2012

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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This article considers the cognitive architecture of human meta-reasoning: that is, metacognition concerning one's own reasoning and decision-making. The view we defend is that meta-reasoning is a cobbled-together skill comprising diverse self-management strategies acquired through individual and cultural learning. These approximate the monitoring-and-control functions of a postulated adaptive system for metacognition by recruiting mechanisms that were designed for quite other purposes.

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“…9 sec. 3) notes, if metacognition had evolved for purposes of cognitive control we would expect people to have good native capacities to control, troubleshoot, and improve their own reasoning process. But we seem to have very poor natural competence in evaluating and reasoning about our own reasoning (Bos et al 2008;Moshman 2004;Pillow 2002;Weinstock et al 2004). Furthermore there are proposals, like the one presented by Carruthers that show that there is no need to appeal to metacognition and that mindreading abilities suffice for explaining the empirical data on reflective thinking (ch.…”

Section: The Relation Between Metacognition and Mindreadingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?

Sebastián

2016

THEORIA

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Many have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order-Representationalist (HOR) theories attempt to explain such self-awareness by means of higher-order representation. Consciousness depends on our capacity to represent our own mental states: our Theory of Mind. It is generally agreed that such an ability can be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. I will argue that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories.Keywords: Consciousness, Self-awareness, Higher-Order Theories, Theory of Mind, Mindreading, Metacognition.RESUMEN: Muchos han argumentado que la diferencia entre estados fenoménicamente conscientes y otros tipos de estados reside en la auto-conciencia implícita que muchos estados conscientes poseen. Las Teorías de la Representación de Orden Superior (HOR) pretenden explicar esa auto-conciencia mediante representaciones de orden superior. La conciencia depende de nuestra capacidad de representar nuestros propios estados mentales: nuestra Teoría de la Mente. Se acepta en general que esta capacidad puede descomponerse en otras dos: la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognición. Argumentaré que la conciencia no puede depender de la lectura de mentes. La sostenibilidad de las teorías HOR depende, por tanto, de la relación entre la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognición. Analizo algunas concepciones de esa relación y argumento que ninguna de ellas parece ser una opción plausible para las teorías HOR.Palabras clave: conciencia, auto-conciencia, teorías de orden superior, teoría de la mente, lectura de mentes, meta-cognición.

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: From inference to reasoning: The construction of rationality

Cited by 70 publications

References 57 publications

Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children’s intuitive reasoning

Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children’s intuitive reasoning

Metacognition and reasoning

Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?

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