From Incorrect Deductive Reasoning to Ingroup
                    Favouritism

Scaillet, Nathalie; Leyens, Jacques‐Philippe

doi:10.4135/9781446218617.n4

Cited by 31 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Because the focus of interest is not about positive and negative traits, but rather about emotions and infra‐humanization, rules involving the participants' in‐group or an out‐group, and primary or secondary emotions, were adopted. In line with Scaillet and Leyens (2000), the first hypothesis is that participants should evaluate in‐group secondary emotion cards as more relevant to verify the rule than out‐group secondary emotion ones. Indeed, if people are motivated to achieve the desirable conclusion that the in‐group possesses the human essence, then relevance of in‐group and secondary emotions cards should be higher than relevance of out‐group and secondary emotions cards.…”

Section: The Wason Selection Taskmentioning

confidence: 74%

“…Scaillet and Leyens (2000; Scaillet, 2000) used the WST to study stereotypes in intergroup context. Their hypothesis was that introducing social variables such as groups (in‐group vs out‐group) and traits (positive vs negative) in the rule would have an impact on the interpretation of the conditional statement, which in turn would influence the selected cards.…”

Section: The Wason Selection Taskmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To the same extent that the selection of the most relevant pair of cards reflects the preferred association of a specific characteristic with a particular group (Scaillet, 2000; Scaillet & Leyens, 2000), the selection of the least relevant pair should be a sign of disliking the association of a feature with a specific group, or at least a sign that such an association should be avoided. Indeed, since the social status of the cards acts as a pragmatic factor to guide participants' responses for the most relevant cards (Scaillet & Leyens, 2000), there is no reason to believe that it could not influence their answers to the least pertinent associations. Consequently, the second hypothesis predicts that, because in‐groupers are motivated to avoid the undesirable conclusion that out‐groups share humanity to the same extent that they do, participants will more often evaluate out‐group secondary emotion associations as the least important ones to verify the rule.…”

Section: The Wason Selection Taskmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus motivation to avoid an undesirable conclusion: The case of infra‐humanization

et al. 2005

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Social motivation has been shown to influence various cognitive processes. In the present paper, it is verified that people are motivated to view out‐groups as possessing a lesser degree of humanity than the in‐group (Leyens et al., 2000) and that this motivation influences logical processing in the Wason selection task. So far, studies on infra‐humanization have been shown to influence attribution of uniquely human characteristics to groups. Most of these studies focused on the attribution of secondary emotions. Results have shown that secondary emotions are preferentially attributed to in‐group members (Leyens et al., 2001). Also, people tend to react differently to in‐group and out‐group members displaying secondary emotions (Gaunt, Leyens, & Sindic, 2004; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). In the present paper, it is argued that infra‐humanization is a two‐direction bias and that it does influence logical processing among perceivers. Specifically, infra‐humanization motivation impacts logical processing in two different directions. First, most motivation is spent to reach the desirable conclusion that the in‐group is uniquely human. Second, least motivation occurs to support the undesirable conclusion that the out‐group is uniquely human. These hypotheses are tested in four cross‐cultural studies that varied the status and the conflicting relations between groups. Results were in line with the predictions and further confirmed that infra‐humanization biases can be obtained independently of status and conflict (but see Cortes, Demoulin, Leyens, & de Renesse, 2005). The discussion relates these findings with in‐group favouritism and out‐group derogation (Brewer, 1999) and underlines the importance of infra‐humanization in counteracting system justification biases (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

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Section: The Wason Selection Taskmentioning

confidence: 74%

Section: The Wason Selection Taskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Wason Selection Taskmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus motivation to avoid an undesirable conclusion: The case of infra‐humanization

et al. 2005

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“…This implies that it is essential in an intergroup context to view positively one's in-group (any social category that individuals belong to that is salient at the given moment) more than any out-group (social categories that individuals do not identify with at that same moment). Empirical studies support this assumption (Campbell, 1967;Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1994;Esses & Zanna, 1995;Peabody, 1968;Rustemli, Mertan & Ciftci, 2000;Saenger & Flowerman, 1954;Scaillet & Leyens, 2000;Smedley & Bayton, 1978).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Differentiating in‐group favoritism from shared reality in intergroup perception

Dimdiņš

Montgomery

2004

Scandinavian J Psychology

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Two basic factors influence mutual ratings of social groups: in-group favoritism (related to the evaluative aspects of a rating) and the perception of shared reality (related to the descriptive aspects). In two studies, we examine the usefulness of Peabody's (1968) method of separating evaluative and descriptive aspects of rating in intergroup judgments. In Study 1, Latvian and Russian students made different evaluations of both groups, but the same groups agreed on the descriptive ratings. In Study 2, male and female psychology students rated each other from own, in-group, and out-group perspectives. The participants did not show any in-group favoritism in their own ratings, but they expected their fellow students to be in-group biased. The participants agreed on the descriptive ratings of both groups. The results demonstrate that shared reality influences intergroup ratings, despite differences in evaluations.

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“…Finally, this experiment confirms that the need to protect in-group value is an important drive for social action. Its effects are fascinating: It influences the processes of deductive reasoning (Scaillet & Leyens, 2000), those of attribution (Hewstone, 1990), and the processes of categorical inclusion (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992). It gives rise to linguistic biases in favor of the in-group (Maass & Arcuri, 1996) and affects the influential power of persuasive messages.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific Communication and Stereotype Change¹

Capozza

Volpato

Falvo

2003

J Applied Social Pyschol

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The aim of this experiment is to examine whether communicating the results of social psychological research improves out‐group stereotypes and diminishes in‐group bias. The experimental material consisted of 2 communications: one described Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) experiment on illusory correlation (Experiment 1); the other described Sherif's (1966) studies on summer camps. The results of the present experiment show that knowledge of Sherif's findings had no effect on evaluations, whereas an awareness of the experiment on illusory correlation produced a boomerang effect, accentuating, rather than diminishing, in‐group bias. A second experiment revealed that the persuasive power of a scientific message on stereotypes depends on whether in‐groups and out‐groups are cogni‐tively present in the message acquisition phase.

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From Incorrect Deductive Reasoning to Ingroup Favouritism

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus motivation to avoid an undesirable conclusion: The case of infra‐humanization

Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus motivation to avoid an undesirable conclusion: The case of infra‐humanization

Differentiating in‐group favoritism from shared reality in intergroup perception

Scientific Communication and Stereotype Change¹

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From Incorrect Deductive Reasoning to Ingroup Favouritism

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus motivation to avoid an undesirable conclusion: The case of infra‐humanization

Motivation to support a desired conclusion versus motivation to avoid an undesirable conclusion: The case of infra‐humanization

Differentiating in‐group favoritism from shared reality in intergroup perception

Scientific Communication and Stereotype Change1

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Scientific Communication and Stereotype Change¹