From Essence to Necessity via Identity

Abstract

An essentialist theory of modality claims that the source of possibility and necessity lies in essence, where essence is (obviously) then not to be defined in terms of necessity. Hence such theories owe us an account of why it is that the essences of things give rise to necessities in the way required. A new approach to understanding essence in terms of the notion of generalized identity promises to answer this challenge by appeal to the necessity of identity. I explore the prospects for this approach, and argue that it fails. If one favours an account of essence in terms of generalized identity, then one will not, I argue, be able to satisfactorily defend an essentialist theory of modality against the challenge; if one wishes to defend an essentialist theory of modality, and thereby to give an explanation of how necessity arises from essence, one should not understand essence in terms of generalized identity.

Essence

“… Michael Gorman (2014), though he does not deny that essence entails necessity, wishes to leave open the possibility of such a denial. I discuss his view in Section 2.3.23 SeeLeech (2021) for a searching discussion of this principle.24 A similar view is suggested byQuine's (1966: 174) characterization of essentialism.https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108935494 Published online by Cambridge University Press…”

“…], it is because there is something in the nature of the world that prevents there being other kinds; and the mere fact that there are no other kinds can hardly be taken to constitute an adequate account of what this force, or form of necessity, might be." 33 See Leech (2021) for discussion of this issue. 34 Mackie (2020) expresses a related worry when she says that one cannot "deliver a modal rabbit out of a non-modal hat" (252).…”

“…The claim that things have their identities necessarily has been questioned byLeech (2018Leech ( , 2021 andMackie (2020).18 One might think that Correia and Skiles have simply reversed the direction of the explanatory connection recognized by Fine: while Fine explains identity in terms of essence, Correia and Skiles explain essence in terms of identity. But this is not correct.…”

On the necessity of essence

“…SeeMaurin (2019) for the general notion of metaphysical explanation, as well as the dependency constraint.6 It is indeed a conjecture since there is not-to my knowledge-a successful argument to the effect that essences are necessary. One attempt is made byHale (2013), but it presumably fails asRomero (2019) andLeech (2020) argue. SeeWallner and Vaidya (2020) for a reply.…”

“…However, it is possible to prove the necessity of essence if one opts for Correia & Skiles's (2019) 'generalized-identity' essentialism, but I will not discuss this view here. SeeLeech (2020) for a detailed discussion of the proof in question.7 Glazier (2017) provides arguments to the effect that we can never have essence-truths of the type 'E(y) E(x)p' (where y=x or y≠x). However, I will ignore this for the sake of the argument and return to it later on.…”