From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism

Chrisman, Matthew

doi:10.1007/s11098-005-2012-3

Cited by 99 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Ethical expressivism, for instance, is usually presented as a semantic solution to the controversy concerning the existence of sui generis moral facts (Chrisman, 2007). In this sense, I would like to provide a superficial view of how expressivism about folk psychology could put forward a similar move in the debate concerning the ontological commitment of our ascriptions.…”

Section: Concluding Remarks: Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

The expressive function of folk psychology

Castro

2017

Filosofia Unisinos

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The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.Keywords: folk psychology, propositional attitudes ascriptions, reasons, expressivism, descriptivism . RESUMOO objetivo deste artigo é apresentar um desafio à visão recebida na psicologia popular. De acordo com este desafio, a suposição semântica por trás da visão recebida, que considera que as proposições de atitude proposicional são descrições dos comportamentos subjacentes internos causalmente eficazes, não podem explicar a função principal de razões em termos de estados mentais.Palavras-chave: psicologia popular, adscrição de atitudes proposicionais, razões, expressivismo, descritivismo.

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Section: Concluding Remarks: Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

The expressive function of folk psychology

Castro

2017

Filosofia Unisinos

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“…"Coherence and agreement on the plain facts doesn't guarantee agreement on whether" someone knows, for whether we attribute knowledge to someone will depend on our plans; the concept of knowledge is thus "plan-laden." (p. 228) Along similar lines, Matthew Chrisman (2007) articulates a "norm-expressivist" account of knowledge attributions, on which the attribution of knowledge to S expresses a complex state of mind consisting of both (i) the belief that S is entitled by norms e to her true belief that p and (ii) the acceptance of those norms (p. 241). This is compatible with a plurality of semantic accounts of epistemic discourse.…”

Section: Expressivism About Epistemic Discoursementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is compatible with the view, defended by early expressivists, that the sentences involved in epistemic discourse are not "truth apt." But contemporary expressivists reject this view, in favor of the view that the relevant utterances are "truth apt" (Chrisman 2007, p. 237, Field 2009. They propose an account on which utterances of such sentences express both beliefs (and so are often true) and non-cognitive attitudes; for example, see Chrisman's (i) and (ii), above.…”

Section: Expressivism About Epistemic Discoursementioning

confidence: 99%

“…On Chrisman's (2007) view, for example, to attribute knowledge to S is to express your belief in the proposition that S is entitled by norms e to her true belief that p, so disagreement about whether someone knows something might just come down to old-fashioned cognitive disagreement about the truth of that proposition. However, this isn't the end of the story:…”

Section: Expressivism About Epistemic Discoursementioning

confidence: 99%

“…But we can, if we are comfortable, go further, by adopting a social-functional account of the value of epistemic discourse (Craig 1990, Williams 2002. "Knowledge attributions," Chrisman (2007) writes, "could be seen as playing a crucial role in keeping track of who can be trusted about which kinds of information." (p. 242-3) For these (and other) reasons, "treating a belief as a known belief is beneficial in the right sort of circumstances," (Kappel 2010, p. 184) and in connection with this we might "debate norms by debating whether they are likely to lead to desirable results -in particular, truth-oriented results of various sorts."…”

Section: )mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Expressivism and convention-relativism about epistemic discourse

Hazlett

2014

Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue

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Forthcoming in A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (Cambridge University Press).Consider the claim that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, the claim that true belief is epistemically valuable, and the claim that one epistemically ought to cleave to one's evidence. These are examples of what I'll call "epistemic discourse." Here I'll propose and defend a view called "convention-relativism about epistemic discourse." In particular, I'll argue that convention-relativism is superior to its main rival, expressivism about epistemic discourse. Expressivism and convention-relativism both jibe with antirealism about epistemic normativity, which is motivated by appeal to philosophical naturalism ( §1). Convention-relativism says that epistemic discourse describes how things stands relative to a conventional set of "epistemic" values; such discourse is akin to criticism relative to the conventional rules of a club ( §2). I defend conventionrelativism by appeal to a "reverse open question argument," which says, pace expressivism, that epistemic discourse leaves normative questions open ( §3).My three examples of epistemic discourse (above) represent three species of epistemic discourse: (i) attributions of the property of being an epistemic virtue, or "epistemic virtue attributions," for short, (ii) attributions of the property of having epistemic value, or "epistemic value attributions," for short, and (iii) attributions of epistemic obligation. 1Epistemic virtue attributions and epistemic value attributions are species of epistemic evaluation; epistemic obligation attributions can be understood as non-evaluative.Epistemic discourse seems normative. I'll appeal to a more precise criterion of the normativity of discourse, below ( §3.1), but the following will suffice to motivate the idea that epistemic discourse seems normative. To say that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue seems to be to say that openmindedness really is a virtue, i.e. that it is good or desirable or admirable to be openminded; to say that true belief is epistemically valuable seems to be to say that true belief really is valuable, i.e. that true belief is good or worthy of pursuit or approbation; to say that one epistemically ought to cleave to one's evidence seems to be to say that one really ought to cleave to one's evidence, i.e. that one would (or at least could) deserve blame or censure or sanction for not so cleaving. As Christine Korsgaard (1996)

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Introduction

Kyriacou¹,

McKenna²

2018

Metaepistemology

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From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism

Cited by 99 publications

References 26 publications

The expressive function of folk psychology

The expressive function of folk psychology

Expressivism and convention-relativism about epistemic discourse

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