From CNOOC to Huawei: securitization, the China threat, and critical infrastructure

Campion, Andrew Stephen

doi:10.1080/02185377.2020.1741416

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…According to [ 70 ], instead of developing Chinese soft power in the US, the establishment of Confucius Institutes has provoked a new form of China threat. [ 10 ] cited the China National Offshore Oil Corporation and Huawei as examples of how the US has manufactured the China threat narrative. [ 68 ] looked at Chinese FDI in the US and discovered that geopolitical concerns and nationalism had a negative impact on the public's opinion of the practice [ 35 , 56 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most previous research on the Global Times (mentioned earlier) has been conducted from a communications standpoint. In addition, previous studies of the China threat have focused on specific topics such as Confucius Institutes [ 70 ], Huawei’s thwarted business activities [ 10 ], Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) [ 68 ], China’s high-speed railway diplomacy in Southeast Asia [ 49 ], and the 16 + 1 mechanism in Europe [ 63 ]. In contrast, this study looks at the relationship between the Global Times and the China threat narrative, the first of its kind in the academic literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Global Times and The China Threat Narrative: An Empirical Analysis

Liu

2021

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI

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China’s Global Times has become more popular in the Australian media than ever, and its editor, Hu Xijin, has also gained worldwide attention. The Global Times presents a nationalistic narrative about China and the world. This study, the first of its kind in the academic literature, examines the relationships between the Global Times narrative and the China threat narrative in Australia and worldwide. By applying time series econometric models to weekly datasets from May 2020 to April 2021, this study finds that the Global Times narrative is significantly associated with the level of the China threat narrative in Australia, and the same is true for the corresponding global relationship. This study makes original and significant contributions to the academic literature and has useful implications for policymakers.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Global Times and The China Threat Narrative: An Empirical Analysis

Liu

2021

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI

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“…Meanwhile, although PEs arguably pursue more exclusively economic objectives than SOEs (Amighini et al., 2013), their activities are not entirely isolated from national development objectives. Decision‐makers within MNEs are often integrated into dense state‐business networks, which may provide bureaucrats opportunities to influence and synchronize foreign, industrial, and corporate policy (Buckley et al., 2018; Campion, 2020; Tuman & Erlingsson, 2020). Furthermore, Chinese ministries have established a comprehensive control and monitoring system to guide and coordinate the internationalization of selected businesses and sectors (Buckley et al., 2018).…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…PEs, too, are sometimes mobilized within government initiatives. Some large Chinese PEs such as Huawei, a telecommunications company, and HNA Group, a large conglomerate involved in aviation, logistics, and other services, have also been selected as national champions to help lead the state's “Go Global” agenda, which may enhance their ability to access government subsidies that enable them to grow and compete globally (Campion, 2020; Schaefer, 2020).…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

The rise of Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States: Disentangling investment strategies of state‐owned and private enterprises

Jiang

Bennett

2020

Growth and Change

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Over the last two decades, China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has expanded rapidly. The country is now the world's second-largest source of OFDI. China is often viewed as a monolithic investor, however, without sufficient attention to the differences between investments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises (PEs). To shed light on the internal complexity and heterogeneity of Chinese OFDI, we construct a panel dataset of investments in the U.S. across the 50 states and Washington, D.C. from 2005 to 2017, which we analyze using a spatial autoregressive model. We find clear evidence that the ownership structure of Chinese firms affects investment strategy and entry mode. Statistical analysis indicates that SOEs are more likely to pursue greenfield investment motivated by market-seeking and resource-seeking objectives, while PEs pursue mergers and acquisitions in order to obtain strategic assets. We also detect a positive and significant relationship between the presence of Chinese overseas communities and OFDI, with the strength of the correlation depending on ownership structure. Finally, we find that Chinese OFDI is spatially dependent, meaning that investments flow to states where they are already concentrated nearby. | 1563 HE Et al. 1 | INTRODUCTION Globally, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from emerging economies is rising, and China's multinational enterprises (MNEs) are playing a key part in this expansion (Alon et al., 2018). Since the early 2000s, driven by the Chinese state's "Go Global" policy, Chinese OFDI has reshaped the global economic landscape (Buckley, 2019; Lee, 2018). In 2018, the total value of OFDI from China reached US$143 billion, making the country the world's second-largest source of FDI (World Bank, 2020). Chinese OFDI initially expanded in the late 1990s as state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with their ample domestic strategic assets and support of the government, began looking abroad to invest (Gaur et al., 2018). In contrast to profit-seeking MNEs headquartered in advanced market economies, Chinese MNEs tend to be more state-directed or at the very least state-influenced. With substantial government backing, SOEs have historically dominated Chinese OFDI (Buckley, 2019; Deng, 2007). State support has allowed many Chinese MNEs to address ownership-specific disadvantages and engage in investment activities in environments that private firms might consider too politically risky (Buckley, 2019; Lu et al., 2018; Ramasamy et al., 2012). Yet, in recent years, Chinese OFDI has shifted from government-driven investment by central SOEs to more market-driven investment by private enterprises (PEs) (Li & Hendrischke, 2019). As Chinese firms, particularly privately owned ones, seek to expand abroad, they may turn to other sources of assistance apart from the Chinese government. Historically, by offering various forms of support, backing, and guarantees, Beijing has helped internationalizing Chinese firms to overcome obstacles in host countries such as informat...

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“…Campion (2020, p. 48) states that, despite deepening integration between China and the West, the prevalence of the "China Threat Discourse" relies on the othering of China, and the securitization of China-related issues to protect American interests. In asserting that China and Chinese-affiliated actors are threats, the United States and its allies, are reserving justifications for action against China that fall beyond the limitations of established international norms (Campion, 2020). To mitigate this hostility, scholarly discussions regarding the rise of China should orbit away from the bifurcated lenses of confrontation or cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Situating Petrostate Guyana in the Rise of China Discourse

Cheong

2021

Potentia

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By examining the Sino-Guyanese relationship and China’s parastatal involvement in Guyana, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the former’s potential for upending conventional geopolitical realities in Latin America and the Caribbean are overstated. As Western public concern regarding the perils of a China to the international order grows, the case of Guyana draws attention to China’s still deepening integration within the neoliberal global economy. Guyana’s historic relationship with China, geostrategic location as a Belt and Road Initiative partner country, and the recent emergence of the Guyana Basin as an energy nexus, suggests its importance as a bellwether of China’s presence in the region. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, assumptions regarding China’s re-emergence in the global order are being overturned frequently. It remains unclear what impact contemporary socio-economic, political, or ecological instabilities will have on a realignment of the incumbent international system, the need for nuanced and novel approaches for assessing the agency of a risen China is unequivocal.

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From CNOOC to Huawei: securitization, the China threat, and critical infrastructure

Cited by 17 publications

References 36 publications

The Global Times and The China Threat Narrative: An Empirical Analysis

The Global Times and The China Threat Narrative: An Empirical Analysis

The rise of Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States: Disentangling investment strategies of state‐owned and private enterprises

Situating Petrostate Guyana in the Rise of China Discourse

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