From Byron to bin Laden

An Overview of the Fake News Phenomenon: From Untruth-Driven to Post-Truth-Driven Approaches

“…Finally, those who reflect on fake news' shareworthiness focus on the influence of motivated reasoning, partisanship, populism, and emotiveness on the willingness to share ("partisan theory"; see Osmundsen et al, 2021), or compare real and fake news sharing taking into account sentiment analysis or basic emotions conveyed by news content: anger, fear, anticipation, trust, surprise, sadness, joy, and disgust (Metzger et al, 2021;Vosoughi et al, 2018). They also reflect on "sharing" as a polysemic and complex activity, which includes not only endorsing, republishing, or quoting, but also questioning the news or denouncing fake news taking stances in a battle of narratives (Arielli, 2018;Metzger et al, 2021).…”

Fighting to belong: drivers for transnational diaspora military service in Israel and beyond

“…We can identify five main types of transnational military engagements in the literature: (1) voluntary diaspora mobilization in response to national or ethnic crises, as seen today in Ukraine (Tidman, 2022), in the Former Yugoslavia during the 1990s (Hockenos, 2003), and in 1948 Israel and Palestine (Arielli, 2014); (2) conscription requirements for citizens residing abroad, as exemplified by South Korea (Choi & Chung, 2018;Song, 2015), Singapore (Teo and Cabuyao 2018), and Turkey (Sunata, 2016); (3) foreign military migration for socioeconomic mobility, as seen in the USA (Apteker 2015(Apteker , 2023, the UK (Ware, 2012), and France (Porch, 2010); (4) voluntary foreign fighting, a broad category stretching from the Spanish Civil war to Ukraine and ISIS fighters (Arielli, 2018(Arielli, , 2023Malet, 2013;Swed, 2023); and (5) temporary contracts, as in private forces (Grasmeder, 2021;Hanson & Lin-Greenberg, 2019). As this study examines diaspora groups in a migratory context, it focuses on the first three categories.…”

“…In recent decades, hundreds of thousands have returned as diaspora fighters, including Croats, Serbs, Jews, Armenians, Kurds, and more recently Ukrainians and Russians. Kinship ties, solidarity, social networks, activism histories, and long-distance nationalism often motivate this risky commitment (Arielli, 2014(Arielli, , 2018Hockenos, 2003;Tidman, 2022;Weiss, 2020). While egoistic reasons and other push factors also come into play, patriotic and ideological concerns hold considerable weight.…”

“…The primary survey section for the present analysis featured a series of eighteen Likert statements (1-strongly disagree; 5-strongly agree) on enlistment motivations. The statements were drawn from and aspired by pre-survey interviews, studies on topics such as ethnic/diaspora return migration (Tsuda, 2009), Jewish immigration and attitudes towards Israel (Sasson, 2014), and transnational military engagements (Arielli, 2018;Ware, 2012).…”

“…This study contributes to scholarship on transnational military engagement (Arielli, 2018(Arielli, , 2023Grasmeder, 2021;Hanson and Greenberg 2019;Malet, 2013) by identifying three common motivational models across contexts: the "ideological model" based on conviction, the "mobility model" focused on upward mobility, and the "reconnection model" for strengthening national belonging. These models emerge through parallels between diaspora soldiers in Israel and other contexts.…”