From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning

Boissin, Esther; Caparos, Serge; Raoelison, Matthieu; Neys, Wim De

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104645

Cited by 44 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Because gist-based thinking can be trained, (e.g., Reyna & Mills, 2014 ), FTT predicts that some high school and college students, like older adults, are capable of curbing the transmission of COVID-19 but doing so depends on cultivating and inculcating the right gist ( Reyna, 2021; Boissin et al, 2021 ). Having a reliable source of accurate information about the gist of how SARS-CoV-2 is spread and what it means to get sick with COVID-19 is essential, although knowledge and gist representations of information are not sufficient.…”

Section: Developmental Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Viruses, vaccines, and COVID-19: Explaining and improving risky decision-making.

Reyna

Broniatowski

Edelson

2021

Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

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Risky decision-making lies at the center of the COVID-19 pandemic and will determine future viral outbreaks. Therefore, a critical evaluation of major explanations of such decision-making is of acute practical importance. We review the underlying mechanisms and predictions offered by expectancy-value and dual-process theories. We then highlight how fuzzy-trace theory builds on these approaches and provides further insight into how knowledge, emotions, values, and metacognitive inhibition influence risky decision-making through its unique mental representational architecture (i.e., parallel verbatim and gist representations of information). We discuss how social values relate to decision-making according to fuzzy-trace theory, including how categorical gist representations cue core values. Although gist often supports health-promoting behaviors such as vaccination, social distancing, and mask-wearing, why this is not always the case as with status-quo gist is explained, and suggestions are offered for how to overcome the “battle for the gist” as it plays out in social media.

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Section: Developmental Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Viruses, vaccines, and COVID-19: Explaining and improving risky decision-making.

Reyna

Broniatowski

Edelson

2021

Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition

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“…First, perhaps some of the logical structures we used were too complex. As recent theoretical and empirical studies have claimed, intuitive logic is primarily the result of an automatization process in which simple logic rules had been trained and practiced enough so that individuals can automatically and intuitively use or evaluate them (Boissin et al, 2021;De Neys & Pennycook, 2019;Handley & Trippas, 2015). An example of such simple logic rules is the MP conditional: "If I study hard for the exam (p), then I will pass (q); I studied hard in the last few days (p); Therefore, I will pass the exam today (q)".…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More importantly, the second goal was to investigate whether training in logic selectively enhances the impact of validity for logic judgmentsin particular, reducing the impact of pseudo-validityor whether training also reduces the pseudo-validity effect for belief judgments. Previous research has found that a short training session can be successful at increasing the rate of normatively correct responses, including for either logic judgments or other reasoning judgments made in conditions that foster intuitive thinking (Boissin et al, 2021;Purcell et al, 2020). If the evaluation of logical rules drives the logic-belief effect, then training participants in conditional rules should minimize the pseudo-validity effect under belief instructions, for pseudo-logical arguments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical intuitions or matching heuristic? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments

Ghasemi

Handley

Stephens³

2022

Preprint

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Are people able to successfully evaluate logic intuitively, without engaging in deliberative thinking? Recent research has revealed that when individuals are asked to simply evaluate the believability of deductively valid or invalid arguments, they often endorse valid arguments at higher rates than invalid ones. This effect of validity on belief judgments – the “logic-belief effect” – is considered to be evidence of intuitive logic or logical intuitions. However, a recent study challenged the intuitive logic interpretation by demonstrating that ‘pseudo-logical’ arguments, such as affirmation of the consequent, where there is a compelling but invalid inference invited, interfere with contrasting belief judgments in the same way as valid logical structures do, and hence, the logic-belief effect may have nothing to do with evaluating logic itself. Instead, this finding suggests that a simple heuristic that relies on the matching of constituent propositions leads to such interference. To further test this matching heuristic account, across two experiments (N = 332), we examined whether training in logic would selectively reduce the endorsement of invalid arguments under logic instructions whilst maintaining the impact of invalid inferences on belief judgments, where a matching cue could drive responses. We instructed participants to evaluate the conclusions of a series of logical and pseudo-logical arguments based on logic or belief, before and after a logic training block. The results showed that whilst both judgment types were impacted by both logical and pseudo-logical structures before training, after training the effect of the latter was indeed minimized in logic judgments but not belief judgments. The results largely support the matching heuristic account, whereby simple considerations of proposition-matching rather than logic assessment underly previous evidence for intuitive logic.

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“…First, the first part of the problem (description) was presented for 4000 ms. Then the critical question and answer options were added and remained on screen until a response was given or until the deadline. The deadline for the initial response was 5000 ms (see Boissin et al, 2021). Two-response format.…”

Section: Which Statement Is Most Likelymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paradigm participants are asked to provide two consecutive responses on every trial (see Procedure). The paradigm's format was based on recent studies in which, during the initial response, participants are asked to perform a load memorization task as well as to respond under a strict deadline, which is pre-tested to be demanding for the respective task (e.g., Bago & De Neys, 2017, 2019aBoissin et al, 2021;Raoelison et al, 2020). During the final response there is no load or deadline.…”

Section: Which Statement Is Most Likelymentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict detection predicts the temporal stability of intuitive and deliberate reasoning

Voudouri

Białek

Domurat

et al. 2022

Thinking & Reasoning

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Although the susceptibility to reasoning biases is often assumed to be a stable trait, the temporal stability of people's performance on popular heuristics-and-biases tasks has been rarely directly tested.The present study addressed this issue and examined a potential determinant for answer change.Participants solved the same set of "bias" tasks twice in two test sessions, two weeks apart. We used the two-response paradigm to test the stability of both initial (intuitive) and final (deliberate) responses.We hypothesized that participants who showed higher conflict detection in their initial intuitive responses at session 1 (as indexed by a relative confidence decrease compared to control problems), would be less stable in their responses between session 1 and 2. Results showed that performance on the reasoning tasks was highly, but not entirely, stable two weeks later. Notably, conflict detection in session 1 was significantly more pronounced in those cases that participants changed their answer between session 1 and 2 than when they did not change their answer between sessions. We discuss practical and theoretical implications.

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From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning

Cited by 44 publications

References 55 publications

Viruses, vaccines, and COVID-19: Explaining and improving risky decision-making.

Viruses, vaccines, and COVID-19: Explaining and improving risky decision-making.

Logical intuitions or matching heuristic? Examining the effect of deduction training on belief-based reasoning judgments

Conflict detection predicts the temporal stability of intuitive and deliberate reasoning

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