From “bandit” to “Amir”—The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf Group as a Jihadi Organization in the Philippines

Singh, Bilveer; Singh, Jasminder

doi:10.1111/aspp.12480

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The influence of ISIS-through the ASG-quickly grew when other terrorist groups and individuals in the Philippines as well as from Indonesia and Malaysia pledged their allegiance and migrated to the southern Philippines to join the fight of establishing a province of Islamic State in East Asia. In 2016, Hapilon received the blessing from ISIS to become the Emir of the Islamic Caliphate in East Asia and subsequently declared Mindanao as the Land of Hijrah (Migrate) and Jihad (Struggle) (Singh & Singh, 2019). Kalicharan (2019) observed that the idea of establishing an Islamic State province in the Philippines that falls under the global caliphate system espoused by ISIS shows a significant departure from the original struggle of the Moro-Muslim political movements that includes MNLF, MILF, and the ASG themselves which is to create an independent state.…”

Section: The Rise Of Isis (2014-2017)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In retrospect, one of the underlying causes of the pro-ISIS groups' capture of Marawi was related to the setbacks suffered by ISIS in their main operational areas in Iraq and Syria (Singh & Singh, 2019). That is the first sign of the waning influence of ISIS and it got worsened when they reportedly lost their last stronghold in Syria in 2019.…”

Section: Post-isis Years (2018-present)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Deterred But Not Defeated: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience

Razak Ahmad,

Zikri Rosli

2023

MJIR

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The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is known for its criminal and terror operations. Since the group's base is located in islands in the southern Philippines such as Basilan and Sulu, its notorious activities have extended to neighbouring countries; Malaysia and Indonesia. Thereby, making the group a destabilising force for regional security. This article discusses the factors that shaped the resilience of the ASG by looking at the evolution of the group for more than three decades. The evolutionary phases of the group will be divided into four: the early years (the 1980s-2001), the post-9/11 tragedy (2002-2014), the rise of ISIS (2014-2017), and the post-ISIS (2018-Present). Based on the analysis of the group’s evolution, this article argues that the ability of the ASG to shift its focus of operations from criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom and piracy to terrorist acts and vice versa has contributed to its resilience. Three interrelated factors have made possible for the fluidity of the group: the factionalised structure of the group, the existence of an international terrorist organization as a patron, and the convenience of committing crimes.

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Section: The Rise Of Isis (2014-2017)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Post-isis Years (2018-present)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Deterred But Not Defeated: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience

Razak Ahmad,

Zikri Rosli

2023

MJIR

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“…It took the Philippine military five months to liberate the city, where over 900 militants, including leaders of two of the participating terrorist groups, and 165 government personnel were killed (Murphy, Oliver, and Maples 2018). The incidences in the Philippines' Marawi City symbolize the ISIS operation in Southeast Asia (Singh, B. and Singh J. 2019).…”

Section: An Overview Of the Isis Threat To The Southeast Asian Regionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional Securitization of the ISIS in the Southeast Asian Counter-Terrorism Strategies for the Post-ISIS Era

Harakan,

Tadjine,

Hartaman

2023

JGS

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In 2017, the United States of America declared the defeat of the ISIS's core territory. Since then, many analysts have argued that the group would threaten the security of several Southeast Asia regions. However, other analysts argued that the threat to the Southeast Asian (SEA) regions should not be exaggerated since it is not serious or critical. This raised the question of alternative regions for its thought and activists. This article critically analyzes the ISIS terrorist threats to SEA regional security in the post-ISIS era. It identifies the key challenges facing the SEA regional counter-terrorism strategies amid the new developments. A qualitative research approach has been adopted with thematic analysis methods in this article. Moreover, the Copenhagen schools' securitization and regional security complex theories have been used as a theoretical framework. Results show that to increase the states and community capacity to deal with this top non-traditional security threat, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its member states continually adopt various initiatives, programs, policies, and strategies.

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“…17 This institution building drive is not, however, universal. For example, despite Abu Sayyaf's stated aim of creating an independent Islamic state in the Philippines, it has not obviously built a bureaucracy, administration, and governing institutionsin sharp contrast to other Islamic armed groups in the country, including the MILF and MNLF (Singh and Singh 2019;South and Joll 2016). While the KNU tries to maintain control over this bureaucracy, it is less able to do so where its administration is weak, the KNLA has a strong presence, and insecurity is high.…”

Section: Institution Buildingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Greed: Why Armed Groups Tax

Bandula-Irwin¹,

Gallien²,

Jackson³

et al. 2021

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Armed groups tax. Journalistic accounts often include a tone of surprise about this fact, while policy reports tend to strike a tone of alarm, highlighting the link between armed group taxation and ongoing conflict. Policymakers often focus on targeting the mechanisms of armed group taxation as part of their conflict strategy, often described as ‘following the money’. We argue that what is instead needed is a deeper understanding of the nuanced realities of armed group taxation, the motivations behind it, and the implications it has for an armed group’s relationship with civilian and diaspora populations, as well as the broader international community. This paper builds on two distinct literatures, on armed groups and on taxation, to provide the first systematic exploration into the motivation of armed group taxation. Based on a review of the diverse practices of how armed groups tax, we highlight that a full account of their motivation needs to go beyond revenue collection, and engage with key themes around legitimacy, population control, institution building, and the performance of public authority. We problematise common approaches towards armed group taxation and state-building, and outline key questions of a new research agenda.

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From “bandit” to “Amir”—The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf Group as a Jihadi Organization in the Philippines

Cited by 7 publications

References 9 publications

Deterred But Not Defeated: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience

Deterred But Not Defeated: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience

Regional Securitization of the ISIS in the Southeast Asian Counter-Terrorism Strategies for the Post-ISIS Era

Beyond Greed: Why Armed Groups Tax

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