From anticipatory strategies to reactive blame games in multi-level settings: the role of structure and politics in stability and policy change

Abstract

Studies of multi-level blame avoidance strategies generally assume that (1) governments prefer to shift responsibility to other levels and (2) an unclear distribution of formal responsibilities complicates blame allocation to a single actor. Considering the temporal location of such strategies – in anticipation or as a reaction to adverse events – the article tests these assumptions. Drawing on the case of air quality policy in Mexico City, the article uses causal process tracing to develop the mechanism leading to an anticipatory strategy and its unfolding. If the distribution of responsibilities on connected policy instruments is clear and major political actors share power, then government levels from different parties engage in a joint anticipatory strategy to avoid crisis and keep stability. The mechanism breakdown leads to reactive behaviour and policy change. Contextual changes redistributing power can destabilise the arrangements, leading to reactive blame games, fostering policy change.

Accountability, governance, and institutional change in intergovernmental relations: A theoretical framework

“…Studies have linked these multiple, conflicting accountabilities and demands to a number of dysfunctions in the public sector, including blame games, transaction costs, ineffectiveness, and general loss of control due to nested principal–agent relations (Koppell, 2005; Mizrahi, 2017; Schillemans & Bovens, 2011). Indeed, Rodríguez (2022) shows that when accountability mechanisms and the distribution of responsibilities are not clear or break down, players engage in reactive multi‐level blame games.…”

“…Elected officials want to promote their career interests and maximize their chances of being re‐elected. They also engage in “blame avoidance behavior” designed to divert blame from themselves for unpopular reforms (Downs, 1957; Hood, 2010; Pierson, 1995; Rodríguez, 2022; Weaver, 1986). We therefore assume that in the case of the failure to provide adequate public goods and services, elected officials take responsibility for the failure based on the degree of accountability they feel they have.…”