Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism

Abstract

U.S. allies that are fighting al-Qaida-linked insurgencies often suffer illegitimate regimes, civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup, economic backwardness, and discriminatory societies. These problems, coupled with allies' divergent interests, serve to weaken allied military and security forces tactically, operationally, and strategically. The ability of the United States to change its allies' behavior is limited, despite the tremendous difficulties these problems create, because relying on allied forces is a key component of U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism and the U.S. goal of handing off security to Iraqi military forces. To reduce the effects of allies' weaknesses, the United States should try to increase its intelligence on allied security forces and at times act more like a third party to a conflict. In addition, Washington must have realistic expectations of what training and other efforts can accomplish.

Promoting the Hegemonic Paradigm: The Case Study of the Journal International Security in the Discipline of International Security Studies

“…All of these theories have in common the postulate that the actions of a state in the international system can be partially explained by domestic variables (bureaucracies, decision-makers and social actors), or that they can be constrained by formal or informal international institutions (treaties, norms, organizations, and so forth). In volume 31, for example, preoccupations Promoting the Hegemonic Paradigm about the "war on terrorism" prompted the authors to consider terrorists as important actors in the international system (Cronin, 2006;Kydd and Walter, 2006;Abrahms, 2006;Byman, 2006;De Nevers, 2007). There is thus a clear tendency toward diversification of what constitutes a threat to security.…”

“…We gathered under the terms "other theories" all articles that do not employ mainstream theories but that favored other rationalist theories such as neoconservatism (Schlesinger, 1976;Rosenbaum, 1977), peace studies theory (Singer, 1976), English School (Bull, 1976), and so forth. Furthermore, a few articles such as Brodie (1976), Quester (1976) and Byman (2006) did not employ any specific theory. xlii In conclusion, there is no clear diversification in the theories employed over the period in question.…”

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

“…58 The new police units formed in Punjab in 1989 should have been guided by the following key factors: high initiative, visible motivation, passion for the job, local trust building and nurturing, terrain awareness, effective intelligence, 59 creative leadership, and political awareness. 60 Most importantly, special counterinsurgency units must be adept at both intelligence gathering and population reassurance.…”

“…7 Nurture entails providing the necessary conditions for building that trust. 8 The most important element to nurture trust is the ability to deliver on commitments, be it infrastructural development, democracy or security to the insurgency affected population. 9 This ability to deliver is crucial to ensure the population's support for counter-insurgency operations as the available choices for the former are intertwined with a certain degree of risk.…”

Irregular Auxiliaries after 1945

“…1 There are only a handful of scholarly articles available on this topic, a number of which remain at the surface of the debate by focusing solely on the tactical and operational potentials and pitfalls of the use of native auxiliaries. 2 Few take into account the broader strategic, political, moral, and legal implications of co-operating with such forces.…”