Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism

Scalability, Social Media and Migrant Assistance: Emulation or Contestation?

“…On the one hand, longstanding forms of sociality that are common in both Thai and Burmese contexts afford MAM with opportunities to mobilise activities, either through forms of gift giving and reciprocity (which helps explain how MAM obtains donations-also builds on a Burmese ethos of selfreliance) and patron-client relations with authorities (in lieu of legal status). As shown in this paper, the instability of MAM's operations may at first glance be explained by the fact that patron client relations are inherently unstable, a point made in scholarship on clientelism for years (Howell et al 1980). However, I suggest that both MAM's doing and undoing cannot be understood without attending to how these forms of connectivity is overlayed and intertwined with the uptake of newfound connectivity through social media.…”

Negociar inclusão pelo clientelismo: democracias neoliberais, pobreza e desigualdade

“…Um elemento comum entre os acadêmicos que analisam tais intercâmbios foi a tendência de vê-los como relações tradicionais que desapareceriam à medida que a sociedade se modernizasse e as agências estatais profissionalizadas assumissem o papel desempenhado pelos patronos (por exemplo, Landé, 1977;ver também Gellner, 1977). No entanto, com o início da modernização, os cientistas sociais observaram trocas personalizadas semelhantes às descritas pelo clientelismo tradicional nos processos de vinculação de aldeias agrícolas aos mercados centrais, de representação de aldeias e periferias urbanas na política central, bem como dentro de instituições políticas e governamentais cada vez mais complexas que requeriam trocas internas e externas de informações e recursos, negociação de políticas e preenchimento de cargos (por exemplo, Weingrod, 1977;Silverman, 1977;Cornelius, 1975;Grindle, 1977).…”

Political Competition and Violence in Mexico: Hierarchical Social Control in Local Patronage Structures

“…The rural cacique has also been described as a political broker who bridges the gap between peasant villages and the national political system (Wolf 1956), and as an economic middleman linking a capitalist national market with noncapitalist forms of agricultural production (Bartra 1993;Pare 1975). Although more common in rural areas, the term has also been used to identify local leaders in low-income urban settlements and at various levels of the party bureaucracy (Cornelius 1975(Cornelius , 1977.…”

“…A cacique's power over other members of a community depends on his ability to monopolize these essential goods and services. Because markets are less competitive and resources scarcer in remote rural areas, such settings are conducive to the dominance of a single individual (Hall 1977;Scott 1977;Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). The practice of caciquismo is therefore more common in rural Mexico (Gonzalez Casanova 1970:32-36;Hansen 1971 :206, 223;Padgett 1966:33).…”

“…Finally, the new elected authorities may at least temporarily lack the coercive power to deter crime. One of the central functions of caciques and patrons more generally is the protection of clients in situations where legal institutions are weak and kinship networks are insufficient to guarantee their personal safety (Hall 1977;Scott 1977;Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). A weakening of a cacique's authority without a simultaneous strengthening of the state's law enforcement capacity may therefore result in an increase in predatory crimes against community members.…”