This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Alternative Futures for Competition with China: The PLA Goes Global, sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific. The purpose of the project was to assess China's development of basing, access, and military capabilities that will allow it to project power beyond the Indo-Pacific region and examine the implications for the U.S. Army as it prepares to compete with China in a global context over the next ten to 20 years.This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army.RAND operates under a "Federal-Wide Assurance" (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as "the Common Rule," as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND's Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this report are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. government. v
SummaryAlthough Chinese economic might around the world has been clear for many years, in the military sphere, China has long been perceived as primarily a regional power. But in military matters, too, Beijing has voiced its determination to become a leading global power. Overseas military access and basing is a critical component of China's global military ambitions. With the opening of its first overseas military facility in Djibouti in 2017, China appeared to take a major step toward global power projection. The strategic implications of such access and basing outside of China's immediate periphery are hotly debated, however, with some observers warning of the perils of Chinese overseas basing and others arguing that China has not shown signs of becoming a "traditional" military actor in regions far from its shores. Faced with this uncertainty about China's long-term basing and access ambitions, what should U.S. decisionmakers and military planners do? In this report, we consider historical lessons to help anticipate what Chinese overseas access and basing might look like in ten to 20 years, that is, in the 2030s, by examining three case studies of overseas military access and basing among the United States' competitors: • French bases in francophone Africa during Charles de Gaulle's presidency • Soviet bases ringing the Mediterranean and Red Seas under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev • Russian bases in Syria during the ongoing Syrian civil war. 1France, the Soviet Union, and Russia-together with the United States (which we examine in Chapter 5)are the states with the largest networks of overseas military bases in the post-World War II period. These cases represent a range of comp...