French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble for West Africa

Abstract

This paper is a contribution to the current debate about the origins of the scramble for West Africa. It analyses the internal dynamics of French expansion and argues that the crucial change in French African policy occurred not in 1882–3, as commonly assumed, but in 1879–80. The policies adopted at this time, although their roots can be traced back to the governorship of Louis Faidherbe in Senegal, were distinguished by a new willingness on the part of the government in Paris to establish political as well as economic claims to West African territory, and by its readiness to bear the financial and military burdens of territorial expansion. Changes in French domestic politics or foreign relations cannot adequately account for this transition from informal to formal expansion, nor can it be explained solely in terms of commercial agitation in France or West Africa. The influence of public opinion and of colonial agents on the formulation of policy was more significant, but the crucial decisions were taken by the policy-makers themselves, and in particular by Charles de Freycinet (Minister of Public Works and later Prime Minister) and Admiral Jean Jauréguiberry (Minister of Marine and Colonies). They, above all, were responsible for inaugurating the era of French imperialism in West Africa. The new imperialism was most apparent in the drive to create a vast territorial empire in the Sudanese interior. But it was also evident in the intensification of commercial rivalries along the West African coast, and the paper argues that French actions there in 1882–3 were the continuation of policies adopted three years before rather than immediate responses to the British occupation of Egypt or to the growth of popular support for African expansion. Accordingly, the beginnings of French imperialism in West Africa are advanced as the principal cause of the scramble.

If the Hat Fits: Revisiting Chinese “Neo‐Imperialism” in Africa From a Comparative Historical Perspective

“…The Frenchman Major Gustave Borgnis‐Desbordes was a classic example. Placed in charge of Upper Senegal in the 1880s, he disobeyed orders, launched daring unauthorized military offensives, and was “virtually impossible to control” (Newbury & Kanya‐Forstner, , p. 266). There were many others of his ilk, ranging from the armistice‐breaking Major‐General George Colley through to Louis Alexandre Brière de L'Isle, the governor of Senegal in 1876.…”

“…There were many others of his ilk, ranging from the armistice‐breaking Major‐General George Colley through to Louis Alexandre Brière de L'Isle, the governor of Senegal in 1876. Brière “demonstrated the metropolitan government's inability to control a determined local subordinate who was astute enough to perceive its weaknesses and bold enough to exploit them” (Newbury & Kanya‐Forstner, , p. 259). Such were the hazards of long‐distance instructions to strong personalities, and such was the modus operandi of states separated from their agents by great distances and often thwarted by alternate agendas and local imperatives.…”

The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882

“…The difficulty here is that French plans for moving into West Africa were formulated in 1879, three years before the occupation of Egypt, and therefore cannot have been prompted by it. 168 In fact, the French congratulated the British on the action they took in 1882 because it appeared to safeguard rather than to imperil French business and personnel. 169 At that time France was heavily engaged in Tunisia, Algeria, and Indochina, and used Britain's action in Egypt to assist her there rather than in sub-Saharan Africa.…”

Africa and the World Economy

“…103 On the other hand, the most severe critics of Hobson and Lenin can concede the importance of trade. Some studies have shown as well that perceptions of economic gain-especially in the case of France-can be more relevant to understanding what happened than the realities (Fieldhouse, 1973;Newbury and Kanya-Forstner, 1969;Hynes, 1969). And Ronald Robinson's recasting of arguments about the breakdown of older collaborative mechanisms between Europeans and Africans is compatible with Marxist arguments that stress why European demands escalated in the late nineteenth century (Robinson, 1972;Weiskel, 1980: 239-40).…”