2007
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00655.x
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French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy: Mechanisms of Change and Hybridisation within Models of Capitalism

Abstract: This article analyses the implications of the internationalisation of capital markets, and the influx of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors, for the French model of capitalism. Its central contention is that the global convergence thesis misrepresents contemporary evolutions because it pays insufficient attention to mechanisms of change within models of capitalism. Secondly, framing analysis in terms of hybridisation and fragmentation of national models, rather than convergence, offers greater explanatory pur… Show more

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Cited by 34 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…Bourdieu 1989;Suleimann 1978;Bertin-Mourot 1995, 1997;Zysman 1983;115, 131). This societal elitism is compounded within French capitalism by oligarchic and 'Napoleonic' corporate governance norms that offer the président directeur général (PDG) almost complete freedom to act within the firm (Clift 2007;O'Sullivan 2007). The oligarchic, elitist character of French business throughout the 20 th Century endures today (Offerlé 2009;Grémont 2007, 2010).…”
Section: Conceptions Of the Market And National Traditions Of Economimentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Bourdieu 1989;Suleimann 1978;Bertin-Mourot 1995, 1997;Zysman 1983;115, 131). This societal elitism is compounded within French capitalism by oligarchic and 'Napoleonic' corporate governance norms that offer the président directeur général (PDG) almost complete freedom to act within the firm (Clift 2007;O'Sullivan 2007). The oligarchic, elitist character of French business throughout the 20 th Century endures today (Offerlé 2009;Grémont 2007, 2010).…”
Section: Conceptions Of the Market And National Traditions Of Economimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the German emphasis on rule-bound firms policed by a regulatory order to ensure their 'conformity with the market' is at odds with a French approach to corporate governance where bosses have enormous autonomy in shaping firm behaviour. French company law prioritises not conformity with the market but instead notions of social interest of the firm, l'intérêt social, reflecting a 'common general interest' of the company as a community, emphasising service provision to the community over the market, or competition (see Clift 2007). Deep-seated French hostility to liberalism as a political movement and intellectual tradition, viewing British and American liberalism as an 'anti-model' (Hayward 2007: 343-70) helps explain the non-liberal character of French corporate governance.…”
Section: Conceptions Of the Market And National Traditions Of Economimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is a caveat to this picture of a protectionist French banking system. Within a few years of privatization, the cross-shareholding networks began to unravel and foreign control of the largest national banks increased (Clift, 2007;Culpepper, 2005;Maclean et al, 2001).…”
Section: International National and Local Championsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Despite the decline in cross-shareholding portfolios, important features of the 'financial network economy' remained (Clift, 2012;Dudouet and Grémont, 2010), including shareholding pacts as between BNP Paribas and the insurance giant AXA.…”
Section: International National and Local Championsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2006) The market-making legal fabric of company law in these political economies reflects different traditions of economic thought. In France, the notion of social interest of the firm, l'intérêt social, has always been pervasive (see Clift 2007). As the Viénot report on French corporate governance notes, this intérêt social simply does not exist in Anglo-Saxon law, yet it plays a key role in French company law (Viénot 1995: 935);…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%