2022
DOI: 10.1007/s10988-022-09346-1
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Fregeanism, sententialism, and scope

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“…For instance, following Quine ( 1956) and especially Kaplan (1968) (cf. Kaplan, 1986), many philosophers have held that variables behave differently from names in the scope of attitude verbs, in such a way that (2) is rejected (for recent developments, see Yalcin, 2015, Lederman, 2022. But, crucially, these strategies do not offer any hope for responding to the earlier argument from [B] to [D], because that argument does not use any premise analogous to (2).…”
Section: Higher-order Metaphysics and Propositional Attitudes 327mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, following Quine ( 1956) and especially Kaplan (1968) (cf. Kaplan, 1986), many philosophers have held that variables behave differently from names in the scope of attitude verbs, in such a way that (2) is rejected (for recent developments, see Yalcin, 2015, Lederman, 2022. But, crucially, these strategies do not offer any hope for responding to the earlier argument from [B] to [D], because that argument does not use any premise analogous to (2).…”
Section: Higher-order Metaphysics and Propositional Attitudes 327mentioning
confidence: 99%