“…Künne (2013) provides an excellent discussion about the distinction between grasping a thought and acknowledging its truth in Frege. Also see Greimann (2004) and (2008).…”
Section: The A-theory Reading Of Frege's Conception Of Truthmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…However, Greimann (2004; holds that the object reading does not square well with textual evidence. His first argument is that 'Thought' (Frege 1918a), in which Frege mainly talks about truth, 'is not concerned with determining the logical category of the truth-values; rather, the truth-values are not mentioned at all' (Greimann 2004: 438).…”
Section: Frege's Conception Of Truth: An Object or A Property?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The A-theory reading (Greimann 2004;2014) starts with pointing out that Frege's primary question regarding truth is what kind of role the notion of truth plays in judging and asserting. The gist of the A-theory reading is that Frege's answer to this question develops into the assertion theory of truth.…”
Section: The A-theory Reading Of Frege's Conception Of Truthmentioning
The object reading of Frege's conception of truth holds that, for him, truth is an object-the truth-value the True. Greimann refutes the object reading and suggests an alternative reading. According to his suggested reading, Frege is a proponent of the assertion theory of truth, the main thesis of which is that truth is what is expressed by the form of assertoric sentences, and truth as such is neither an object nor a property. I argue that Frege cannot accept the assertion theory. I also defend the object reading by elaborating it further and replying to Greimann's criticisms.
“…Künne (2013) provides an excellent discussion about the distinction between grasping a thought and acknowledging its truth in Frege. Also see Greimann (2004) and (2008).…”
Section: The A-theory Reading Of Frege's Conception Of Truthmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…However, Greimann (2004; holds that the object reading does not square well with textual evidence. His first argument is that 'Thought' (Frege 1918a), in which Frege mainly talks about truth, 'is not concerned with determining the logical category of the truth-values; rather, the truth-values are not mentioned at all' (Greimann 2004: 438).…”
Section: Frege's Conception Of Truth: An Object or A Property?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The A-theory reading (Greimann 2004;2014) starts with pointing out that Frege's primary question regarding truth is what kind of role the notion of truth plays in judging and asserting. The gist of the A-theory reading is that Frege's answer to this question develops into the assertion theory of truth.…”
Section: The A-theory Reading Of Frege's Conception Of Truthmentioning
The object reading of Frege's conception of truth holds that, for him, truth is an object-the truth-value the True. Greimann refutes the object reading and suggests an alternative reading. According to his suggested reading, Frege is a proponent of the assertion theory of truth, the main thesis of which is that truth is what is expressed by the form of assertoric sentences, and truth as such is neither an object nor a property. I argue that Frege cannot accept the assertion theory. I also defend the object reading by elaborating it further and replying to Greimann's criticisms.
“…The nominal reading claims that in order to make the distinction clearly shown, Frege regards "2 þ 2 = 4" qua an expression of his formal language to mean "the truth-value of: that 2 þ 2 equals 4," which alone cannot be used for the act of assertion because it is not a sentence. A sentence is constructed and assertion is performed only if we write "├," a special truth-predicate or truth-operator that can be translated into "… is the True" (Greimann 2004(Greimann , 2007, in front of such a term.…”
Section: Criticism: the Nominal Reading Can't Be Justifiedmentioning
In the explanations of logical laws and inference rules of the mature version of Begriffsschrift in Grundgesetze, Frege uses the predicate “… is the True.” Scholars like Greimann maintain that this predicate is a metalinguistic truth-predicate for Frege. This paper examines an argument for this claim that is based on the “nominal reading” of Frege’s conception of sentences—the claim that for Frege a sentence “
$ p $
” is equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought that
$ p $
.” In particular, this paper attempts to establish two points concerning this argument based on the nominal reading. First, the argument implies a claim about the nature of assertion which Frege repeatedly denies in his mature works. Secondly, the nominal reading on which the argument depends is false. A sentence “
$ p $
” is not equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought that
$ p $
” for Frege. Our discussion will lead to an important lesson about Frege’s conception of sentences and of assertion.
“…It encounters a number of objections. For instance, both Greimann (2004, 2007) and Künne (2008) point to these passages.What, in the first place, distinguishes it from all other predicates is that predicating it is always included in predicating anything whatever. (Frege, 1897, p. 129)We cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time finding out the thought this thing has this property to be true.…”
Gottlob Frege takes logic to be the science of truth throughout his career. However, the mature Frege makes remarks which seem to go against the idea that logic is the science of truth. This paper shows that we can explain away this tension in the mature Frege's conception of logic if we accept that truth is an object, that is, the truth‐vale True qua the reference of a sentence, for Frege. Even though the main thesis of this paper is a conditional, I provide reasons why we ought to consider the possibility seriously that truth is an object for Frege. I also explain how we can make sense of Frege's conception of logic as the science of truth while accepting truth is an object.
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