Freedom and Necessity

Ayer, A. J.

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_12

Cited by 130 publications

(63 citation statements)

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“…Either it refers to the ability to do otherwise as a compatibilist might understand it, or it functions as a stand-in for other credible compatibilist proposals, such as a view in which an agent who acts freely and is morally responsible is somehow suitably reasons-responsive despite not being able to do otherwise (the latter is the sort of view that I favor). Let it be granted that in these cases, because this 40 For example, see Ayer (1954), Berofsky (1987), Campbell (1997), Horgan (1985), Lehrer (1976), Lewis (1981), Smith (2003) or Vihvelin (2004). 41 For example, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Gert and Duggan (1979) or Haji (1998).…”

Section: Zeroing In On a History Thesismentioning

confidence: 97%

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Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism

McKenna

2012

J Ethics

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Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism all build upon some example or other in which an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring a psychic structure on the basis of which she performs an action. The featured agent, it is alleged, is manipulated into satisfying conditions compatibilists would take to be sufficient for acting freely. Such an example used in the context of an argument for incompatibilism is meant to elicit the intuition that, due to the pervasiveness of the manipulation, the agent does not act freely and is not morally responsible for what she does. It is then claimed that any agent's coming to be in the same psychic state through a deterministic process is no different in any relevant respect from the pertinent manner of manipulation. Hence, it is concluded that compatibilists' proposed sufficient conditions for free will and moral responsibility are inadequate, and that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. One way for compatibilists to resist certain manipulation arguments is by appealing to historical requirements that, they contend, relevant manipulated agents lack. While a growing number of compatibilists advance an historical thesis, in this paper, I redouble my efforts to show, in defense of nonhistorical compatibilists like Harry Frankfurt, that there is still life left in a nonhistorical view. The historical compatibilists, I contend, have fallen shy of discrediting their nonhistorical compatibilist rivals.

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Section: Zeroing In On a History Thesismentioning

confidence: 97%

“…42 For example, see Dworkin (1988), Frankfurt (1971), or Watson (1975. 43 Ayer (1954). 44 Frankfurt (1971).…”

Section: Zeroing In On a History Thesismentioning

confidence: 98%

Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism

McKenna

2012

J Ethics

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“…This too is mistaken. A. J. Ayer makes the point well at the end of his of his classic essay, "Freedom and Necessity" [67]. He says that determinism entails that the future is in some sense "already decided" before we choose.…”

Section: Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remaking Responsibility Complexity and scattered causes in human agency

Fost

Angela²

2013

1st Annual International Conference on Philosophy: Yesterday, Today &Amp; Tomorrow (PYTT 2013)

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Abstract-Contrary to intuitions that human beings are free to think and act with "buck-stopping" freedom, philosophers since Holbach and Hume have argued that universal causation makes free will nonsensical. Contemporary neuroscience has strengthened their case and begun to reveal subtle and counterintuitive mechanisms in the processes of conscious agency. Although some fear that determinism undermines moral responsibility, the opposite is true: free will, if it existed, would undermine coherent systems of justice. Moreover, deterministic views of human choice clarify the conditions in which we ought to protect people from themselves, for example when they cannot give informed consent to medical procedures. Some of the most unresolved questions in this domain are just now emerging; they include robot ethics and the responsibilities of groups. We propose a philosophical and scientific research program to apply complex systems science to these problems.

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“…At times it has been suggested that undetermined action is essentially irrational action, or, at the very least, cannot be given a rational explanation (Ayer 1954). But this is false.…”

Section: Explanatory Formulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument

Franklin

2010

Philos Stud

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In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism-features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments-and showing why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as ''deliberative libertarianism'') will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails.

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Freedom and Necessity

Cited by 130 publications

References 0 publications

Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism

Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism

Remaking Responsibility Complexity and scattered causes in human agency

Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument

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