Freedom and Actual Interference

Abstract

Liberal and republican conceptions of freedom differ as to whether freedom consists in noninterference or non-domination. Pettit defends the republican non-domination conception on the grounds that one can be unfree without being interfered with if one is dominated, and that one can be interfered with yet free if not dominated. I show that these claims mistake the scope of actual interference. In particular, I show that cases said to involve unfreedom without interference do involve interference, and that cases said to involve freedom despite interference— in particular, cases involving government regulations—are cases in which some interference is outweighed by protection from even greater interference. The liberal noninterference conception of freedom, therefore, can account for what Pettit claims can only be accounted for by freedom as non-domination.

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“…57 In book four of The Wealth of Nations, Smith writes: "like an overgrown standing army, [monopolies] have become formidable to the government, and upon many occasions intimidate the legislature." 58 Though see Goldwater (2020) for criticisms of this conception of freedom. 59 See Kahn and Vaheesan (2014) for data and analysis.…”