Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base

Abstract

In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. (Free will is understood here as whatever satisfies the control condition of moral responsibility.) Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief that we are morally responsible undermines many, and perhaps most, of the desert claims we are pretheoretically inclined to accept. But it does not undermine desert claims based on the sheer fact of personhood. Even in the absence of belief in moral responsibility, personhood-based desert claims require us to respect persons and their rights. So personhood-based desert claims can provide a substantial role for desert in free will skeptics’ ethical theories.

Free Will Agnosticism

“…Ben Vilhauer in particular has done much to address the consequences of our not knowing that we have free will. As well the citation above, see also his , and .…”

Moral Responsibility Reconsidered

“…Others, such as James Lenman (2006) and Ben Vilhauer (2009bVilhauer ( , 2013aVilhauer ( , 2013b, ground non-basic desert in social contractualist considerations.…”

“…There is no inconsistency in accepting a Kantian regard for respect for persons without accepting Kant's particular attitudes on free will (see Pereboom 2001: 150-52;Vilhauer 2009bVilhauer , 2013aVilhauer , 2013bCaruso 2021a). Benjamin Vilhauer (2009bVilhauer ( , 2013aVilhauer ( , 2013b, for instance, has convincingly argued that there is an important, often overlooked, distinction between action-based desert claims and personhood-based desert claims. The former is the kind of desert claim at issue in the free will debate, while the latter is not.…”

Justice and the Meritocratic State

“…Clarke (2003); Pereboom (2014);and Waller (2011)) believe that determinism rules out the possibility of moral desert. See also Vilhauer (2009) for a discussion of this issue. 3 See Clements (1984).…”