Free Will, Causality and the Self

Søvik, Atle Ottesen

doi:10.1515/9783110474688

Cited by 4 publications

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“…18 See for example Bok [5], 201-05., or Strawson [43]. 19 See Søvik [39,40]. 20 Mele [26]; Sripada [42].…”

Section: An Event-causal Libertarian Theory Of Free Will and Responsi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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How a non-conscious robot could be an agent with capacity for morally responsible behaviour

Søvik

2022

AI Ethics

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People have different opinions about which conditions robots would need to fulfil—and for what reasons—to be moral agents. Standardists hold that specific internal states (like rationality, free will or phenomenal consciousness) are necessary in artificial agents, and robots are thus not moral agents since they lack these internal states. Functionalists hold that what matters are certain behaviours and reactions—independent of what the internal states may be—implying that robots can be moral agents as long as the behaviour is adequate. This article defends a standardist view in the sense that the internal states are what matters for determining the moral agency of the robot, but it will be unique in being an internalist theory defending a large degree of robot responsibility, even though humans, but not robots, are taken to have phenomenal consciousness. This view is based on an event-causal libertarian theory of free will and a revisionist theory of responsibility, which combined explain how free will and responsibility can come in degrees. This is meant to be a middle position between typical compatibilist and libertarian views, securing the strengths of both sides. The theories are then applied to robots, making it possible to be quite precise about what it means that robots can have a certain degree of moral responsibility, and why. Defending this libertarian form of free will and responsibility then implies that non-conscious robots can have a stronger form of free will and responsibility than what is commonly defended in the literature on robot responsibility.

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“…18 See for example Bok [5], 201-05., or Strawson [43]. 19 See Søvik [39,40]. 20 Mele [26]; Sripada [42].…”

Section: An Event-causal Libertarian Theory Of Free Will and Responsi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…22 Mele [24]. 23 See Schaffer [35]; and Søvik [39], chapter 2. This concludes the presentation of the event-causal theory of free will.…”

Section: An Event-causal Libertarian Theory Of Free Will and Responsi...mentioning

confidence: 99%

How a non-conscious robot could be an agent with capacity for morally responsible behaviour

Søvik

2022

AI Ethics

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“…34 According to the theory presented in this article, it will again depend on the degree to which they can change their behaviour through normal deliberation as a result of being held responsible. If (the threat of) punishment can influence their reasoning and prevent them from doing 32 For details on this, see Søvik (2016).Very briefly put, Alfred Mele defines a desire for A as an A-focused attitude which constitutes motivation for A (Mele, Motivation and Agency (New York: Oxford University Press 2003), p. 170.).…”

Section: What Is Incapacity For Responsible Behaviour?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I do not have space to discuss these objections here, but have done so at length in a book on free will. 42 Here I will only briefly explain how this model navigates different kinds of objections. Some objections to free will (typically against compatibilists who think that free will is compatible with determinism) argue that we cannot be free if the world is determined, such as the manipulation argument and the zygote argument.…”

Section: Responses To Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Revisionary Theoretical Framework of Responsibility: A Philosophical Exploration of Incapacity for Responsible Behaviour (utilregnelighet)

Søvik

2019

BJCLCJ

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The article presents the main features of a theory of responsibility and the conditions that determine who can and cannot be held responsible, with a focus on different types of incapacity for responsible behaviour. The article has four parts. The first three parts answer the following questions: what is responsibility; what is capacity for responsible behaviour; and, what is incapacity for responsible behaviour. Part four answers some possible objections. The answers are based on Antonio Damasio’s understanding of the mind, Manuel Vargas’ revisionary theory of responsibility, and previous work by the author on free will.

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2022

Freier Wille Und Natur(alismus)

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Free Will, Causality and the Self

Cited by 4 publications

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How a non-conscious robot could be an agent with capacity for morally responsible behaviour

How a non-conscious robot could be an agent with capacity for morally responsible behaviour

A Revisionary Theoretical Framework of Responsibility: A Philosophical Exploration of Incapacity for Responsible Behaviour (utilregnelighet)

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