Free choice tasks as random generation tasks: an investigation through working memory manipulations

Abstract

Free choice tasks are tasks in which two or more equally valid response options per stimulus exist from which participants can choose. In investigations of the putative difference between self-generated and externally triggered actions, they are often contrasted with forced choice tasks, in which only one response option is considered correct. Usually, responses in free choice tasks are slower when compared with forced choice task responses, which may point to a qualitative difference in response selection. It was, however, also suggested that free choice tasks are in fact random generation tasks. Here, we tested the prediction that in this case, randomness of the free choice responses depends on working memory (WM) load. In Experiment 1, participants were provided with varying levels of external WM support in the form of displayed previous choices. In Experiment 2, WM load was induced via a concurrent n-back task. The data generally confirm the prediction: in Experiment 1, WM support improved both randomness and speed of responses. In Experiment 2, randomness decreased and responses slowed down with increasing WM load. These results suggest that free choice tasks have much in common with random generation tasks.

Similar proactive effect monitoring in free and forced choice action modes

“…Moreover, forced choice tasks that require a polar response decision for one or the other response option are differentiated from free choice tasks that require an arbitrary decision between multiple equal response options (e.g., Berlyne, 1957 ). There is a controversy regarding whether forced choice and free choice action modes differ in terms of how actions are selected on the basis of anticipated effects (for findings suggesting differences between the two action modes, see, e.g., Herwig & Horstmann, 2011 ; Herwig et al, 2007 ; Herwig & Waszak, 2009 , 2012 ; Naefgen & Janczyk, 2018 ; Waszak et al, 2005 ; see also Ansorge, 2002 ; Zwosta et al, 2013 , for evidence, suggesting that R–E compatibility effects depend upon the intention to produce an effect; but see e.g., Janczyk, Dambacher, et al, 2015 ; Janczyk, Nolden, et al, 2015 ; Janczyk, Pfister, et al, 2015 ; Janczyk et al, 2017 ; Janczyk, Dambacher, et al, 2015 ; Janczyk, Nolden, et al, 2015 ; Janczyk, Pfister, et al, 2015 ; Pfister et al, 2011 ; Pfister & Kunde, 2013 , for contradictory findings suggesting no difference between forced and free choice). The notion that forced choice actions, in contrast to free choice actions, are stimulus-based and do not depend upon a person's intention or will was already described by Ach ( 1935 ).…”

Are freely chosen actions generated by stimulus codes or effect codes?

“…A thorough discussion is beyond the scope of this article (see Gozli, 2019 ). Briefly, recent work suggested that free-choice tasks are essentially random-generation tasks (Naefgen & Janczyk, 2018 ) and exhibit mutual priming effects (e.g., Kiesel et al, 2006 ; Mattler & Palmer, 2012 ; Naefgen, Caissie, & Janczyk, 2017 ). Consequently, forced-choice and free-choice tasks are more and more conceived of in a unified framework instead of reflecting two qualitatively different actions (or action systems; see also Bermeitinger & Hackländer, 2018 ; Naefgen, Dambacher, & Janczyk, 2018 ; Richardson, Pfister, & Fournier, 2020 ).…”

Choice-induced inter-trial inhibition is modulated by idiosyncratic choice-consistency

“…Whereas reward differences successfully biased choice behavior, choice consistency in the unbiased condition was highly variable. It is possible that this behavior depended on the individual strategy with some participants aiming at balanced or random choice behavior [34] while others strategically selected one target they would prefer throughout a block. However, answers given by participants during debriefing suggested that unbiased choice behavior are most likely not explained by conscious strategies: When asked for specific strategies during choice-trials, only one participant noted he/she tried to choose both targets equally often, and two stated they always aimed to select the same choice target.…”