France, Germany and the New Framework for EMU Governance

The Rise and Fall of Merkozy: Franco‐German Bilateralism as a Negotiation Strategy in Eurozone Crisis Management

“…38–43). Finally, this explanation is in line with approaches that emphasize the role of interstate bargaining in accounting for the outcomes of eurozone crisis management (see Maris and Sklias, ; Schild, ; Schimmelfennig, ).…”

“…Whereas most approaches have so far focused on the long‐term persistence of the partnership, this approach seeks to explain short‐term variation. In doing so, it not only constitutes a theoretical innovation, but it draws on the insights offered by existing explanations: while common institutions and ideas (Dyson, ; Krotz and Schild, ) constitute an ideal environment for the employment of pre‐negotiations, Germany's structural power in EMU (Maris and Sklias, , p. 13) allows it to use this strategy to its advantage. The interpretation of Merkozy as a German‐led strategy ties in with Pedersen's realist concept of ‘co‐operative hegemony’: the bilateral pre‐negotiations can thus be seen as a manifestation of Germany's grand strategy leading to an asymmetrical federation (, pp.…”

“…Especially regarding the idea of a discretionary ‘ gouvernement économique ’, as opposed to the rule‐based approach preferred by Germany, preferences differed considerably (see Clift and Ryner, , pp. 140–150; Maris and Sklias, , pp. 13–16).…”