Framing blame: toward a better understanding of the effects of populist communication on populist party preferences

Rebuilding Trust in Broken Systems? Populist Party Success and Citizens’ Trust in Democratic Institutions

“…In line with these expectations, prior research has demonstrated already that populist messages lead to more negative views of the political system among supporters of populist parties (Rooduijn, van der Brug, de Lange, & Parlevliet, 2017) and that populist voters are less trusting of the political system than voters of other parties (Dahlberg & Linde, 2017;Söderlund & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2009). A number of results further indicate that the reception of antisystem messages can damage citizens' attitudes towards the political system (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018;Sheets et al, 2016). At the same time, disenchantment with and cynicism about the political system has been identified as a major driver of populist parties' electoral success (Cutts, Ford, & Goodwin, 2011;Hooghe et al, 2011;Rooduijn, 2018).…”

Populism and the Gender Gap: Comparing Digital Engagement with Populist and Non-populist Facebook Pages in France, Italy, and Spain

“…This study aims at realizing an effects study based on an unobtrusive measurement of observational data. Effects of populist messages have been widely explored especially with respect to populist voting (Bos et al 2011), blame attribution (Hameleers et al 2017, 2018), and populist appeals (Schmuck and Matthes 2017). In most cases, these results derived from experiments using artificial stimuli and lab settings.…”

“…Literature on the role of the key elements, or the types of populism, and gender gap is poorly developed, notwithstanding some evidence emerged. On one hand, attitudes based on antielitism and people-centrism are overrepresented among males (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016), and on the other hand, Hameleers et al (2017) found that males, more than females, are associated with exclusionist dimension of populist attitudes, especially focusing on anti-immigration. Our hypothesis in relation to the Jagers and Walgrave types of populism is then as follows:…”

Social media use and support for populist radical right parties: assessing exposure and selection effects in a two-wave panel study

“…Taken together, the evidence suggests that populist radical right parties, their messages, and the topics for which they hold issue-ownership are likely to be dominant and highly visible on social media platforms, also to citizens who are not directly connected with PRRPs on social media and who do not search for the content, that is, those who are incidentally exposed to the news (see Bode, 2016;Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017;Kim, Chen, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013). Previous research has shown that exposure to such messages can enhance exclusionist attitudes and endorsement for populist radical right parties (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018;2017a;2017b). For example, being confronted with information that attributed blame for negative developments in the Dutch labour market to the national government or the European Union increased the propensity to vote for the Dutch PRRP Partij voor de Vrijheid (Hameleers et al, 2018).…”

“…Previous research has shown that exposure to such messages can enhance exclusionist attitudes and endorsement for populist radical right parties (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018;2017a;2017b). For example, being confronted with information that attributed blame for negative developments in the Dutch labour market to the national government or the European Union increased the propensity to vote for the Dutch PRRP Partij voor de Vrijheid (Hameleers et al, 2018). Moreover, it has been found that the more news media reported on topics related to immigration or crime, the more willing people were to vote for parties that advocated anti-immigrant policies, such as PRRPs (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007;Burscher, van Spanje, & de Vreese, 2015).…”