Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers

Cox, Caleb; Stoddard, Brock

doi:10.3390/g6040394

Cited by 43 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…We thus expect more extreme behavior in the take frame, that is, that people are more likely to pool at the endpoints of the action space (take everything or take nothing). This is also a pattern that was found in several previous studies investigating framing effects (e.g., Cox and Stoddard 2015;Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt 2011;Fosgaard, Hansen, and Wengström 2014). For our purposes, the important part is that a greater number of people are expected to pool at the zerocontribution endpoint in the take frame, which is a consistent finding across previous studies (e.g., Andreoni 1995;Cox 2015;Khadjavi and Lange 2015;Park 2000).…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworksupporting

confidence: 88%

Minimum Levels and Framing in Public Good Provision

2019

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Using a laboratory experiment in the field, we examine how the framing of a social dilemma, give to or take from a public good, interacts with a policy intervention that enforces a minimum contribution level to the public good. We find significantly higher cooperation in the give frame than in the take frame in our standard public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is introduced, contributions are crowded out in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame. Our results show the importance of choosing the frame when making policy recommendations. (JEL C91, H41)

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Section: Theoretical Frameworksupporting

confidence: 88%

Minimum Levels and Framing in Public Good Provision

2019

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“…Frey (1993) provides a theoretical account under which circumstances such monitoring of information on individual contributions might be a good thing for cooperation. Whereas Cox and Stoddard (2015), van der Heijden and Moxnes (1999) and Weimann (1994) find no effect of individual information on contributions, Carpenter (2004) finds that information on individual contributions leads to faster unravelling of cooperation. In particular, he concludes that when subjects learn about the low contributions of others, they try to conform to the observed group's norms of contributing less.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Furthermore, Bigoni and Suetens (2012) show that when individual information on both contributions and earnings is present, a negative aggregate effect obtains. Cox and Stoddard (2015) investigate several dimensions including partner/stranger matching, give/take framing and individual/aggregate information about contributions. In their partners-give-individual/aggregate comparison (which is closest to our setting), they find that individual information slightly increases cooperation, but not significantly so.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personal accountability and cooperation in teams

Sonntag

Zizzo

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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In a real effort lab and online team production experiment, we analyze exerted effort under different conditions of individual accountability. In a repeated setting, we vary the degree to which production can be directly traced back to a collaborator's individual or randomly drawn effort level, respectively. We find that individuals produce much less and the decline of effort over time is significantly steeper under high as compared to low and endogenously chosen personal accountability. While endogenous accountability provides an option for monitoring others, it does not force subjects to learn about their underperforming peers, thus limiting the typical decline of contributions over time. We conclude that accountability one step removed may be an interesting institutional setting for repeated collaborations in contexts where low accountability for political, social or legal reasons is not a viable option.

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“…The work in [40] found no effect, whereas in the experiment reported in [41], aggregate level feedback resulted in subjects making higher contributions to the public goods. The work in [42] ran a design varying framing (give vs. take), matching (partners vs. strangers) and feedback (individual vs. aggregate). They found that in a partners setup with the give framing, there was significantly more free-riding with individual feedback compared to aggregate feedback.…”

Section: Summary and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation and Strategic Complementarity: An Experiment with Two Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Games with Interior Equilibria

Lappalainen

2018

Games

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In public goods game experiments, designs implementing non-linearities in the production are less common than the standard linear setting, especially so under the assumption that the private goods production and public goods aggregation function are both non-linear. We study a voluntary contribution game (VCM) in which returns from the private project have diminishing marginal benefits and the contributions to the joint project exhibit pairwise strategic complementarities. As a control, we use a public goods game with an identical private production technology, but with the standard linear public goods aggregation. In addition to the aggregation technology, we manipulate the group size variable: In both treatments, the subjects will first play a VCM game in groups of five for 20 rounds, after which the group size is reduced to two, and the game is played for another 20 rounds. A significant over-contribution is observed in both settings when the group size is five. The rate of over-contribution is much higher under the complementary technology, but as predicted by theory, the contributions drop drastically when the group size is reduced from n = 5 to n = 2 within this treatment. Our experiment also provides empirical evidence that the so-called group size effect is present in both treatments, but it is much weaker under the standard aggregation technology.

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Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers

Cited by 43 publications

References 35 publications

Minimum Levels and Framing in Public Good Provision

Minimum Levels and Framing in Public Good Provision

Personal accountability and cooperation in teams

Cooperation and Strategic Complementarity: An Experiment with Two Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Games with Interior Equilibria

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