Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes

Hota, Ashish R.; Garg, Siddharth; Sundaram, Shreyas

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.003

Cited by 34 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 66 publications

(77 reference statements)

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“…Recently, there has been significant interest in studying human behavior and its cyber-psychical security impact. The authors in [6] study a common-pool resource game that captures the players' risk preference using tools from prospect theory. The work in [7] uses prospect theory to study the effect of a defender's and attacker's subjective behavior on the security of a drone delivery system.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Psychological Game Theory for Secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) Systems

Sanjab

Saad

2019

IEEE Internet Things J.

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In this paper, a novel anti-jamming mechanism is proposed to analyze and enhance the security of adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) systems. In particular, the problem is formulated as a dynamic psychological game between a soldier and an attacker. In this game, the soldier seeks to accomplish a time-critical mission by traversing a battlefield within a certain amount of time, while maintaining its connectivity with an IoBT network. The attacker, on the other hand, seeks to find the optimal opportunity to compromise the IoBT network and maximize the delay of the soldier's IoBT transmission link. The soldier and the attacker's psychological behavior are captured using tools from psychological game theory, with which the soldier's and attacker's intentions to harm one another are considered in their utilities. To solve this game, a novel learning algorithm based on Bayesian updating is proposed to find a ǫ-like psychological self-confirming equilibrium of the game. Simulation results show that, based on the error-free beliefs on the attacker's psychological strategies and beliefs, the soldier's material payoff can be improved by up to 15.11% compared to a conventional dynamic game without psychological considerations.

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Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Psychological Game Theory for Secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) Systems

Sanjab

Saad

2019

IEEE Internet Things J.

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“…(21) An application of Algorithm 1 to the V2 regime is shown in Figure 5a, where we set C 2 = 0.001, γ = 0.5, θ = 0.5, and [R 1 , S 1 , T 1 , P 1 ] = [3,1,6,2]. Due to the lag γ, public opinion o(t) overestimates n(t) on the intervals where n(t) is decreasing, and underestimates when n(t) is increasing.…”

Section: Environmental Awareness Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dynamical models of these coevolutionary features have been developed to understand general conditions under which tragedies will occur or be averted [3], [4], [5]. Similarly, the study of common-pool resource games suggest that rational play among larger populations leads to resource collapse with higher probability [6], [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal control policies for evolutionary dynamics with environmental feedback

Paarporn

Eksin

Weitz

et al. 2018

2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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We study a dynamical model of a population of cooperators and defectors whose actions have long-term consequences on environmental "commons" -what we term the "resource". Cooperators contribute to restoring the resource whereas defectors degrade it. The population dynamics evolve according to a replicator equation coupled with an environmental state. Our goal is to identify methods of influencing the population with the objective to maximize accumulation of the resource. In particular, we consider strategies that modify individual-level incentives. We then extend the model to incorporate a public opinion state that imperfectly tracks the true environmental state, and study strategies that influence opinion. We formulate optimal control problems and solve them using numerical techniques to characterize locally optimal control policies for three problem formulations: 1) control of incentives, and control of opinions through 2) propaganda-like strategies and 3) awareness campaigns. We show numerically that the resulting controllers in all formulations achieve the objective, albeit with an unintended consequence. The resulting dynamics include cycles between low and high resource statesa dynamical regime termed an "oscillating tragedy of the commons". This outcome may have desirable average properties, but includes risks to resource depletion. Our findings suggest the need for new approaches to controlling coupled populationenvironment dynamics.

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“…We start with the following lemma. While the proof largely follows from identical arguments as the proof of Lemma 1 in [28] (where we considered Fragile CPR games without taxation), we present it here as the proof formally defines several important quantities that are useful in the analysis throughout the paper. Recall thatx −i denotes the total investment by all players other than i.…”

Section: Characteristics Of Pure Nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling human utilization of shared resources via taxes

Hota¹,

Sundaram²

2016

2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences, captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous prospect-theoretic risk preferences can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes. In particular, for resources that exhibit network effects, utilization can increase under taxation and there may not exist a tax rate that achieves the socially optimal level of utilization. We identify conditions under which utilization is monotone and continuous, and then characterize the range of utilizations that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate. We further show that resource utilization is higher when players are charged differentiated tax rates compared to the case when all players are charged an identical tax rate.1 The probability weighting function captures the transformation of true probabilities into perceived probabilities by humans. We do not consider the impact of probability weighting in this work.2 However, there are instances where authorities have shut down large online platforms that encourage illegal activities [23], [24]. This is captured by resource failure in our setting.

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Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes

Cited by 34 publications

References 66 publications

Dynamic Psychological Game Theory for Secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) Systems

Dynamic Psychological Game Theory for Secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) Systems

Optimal control policies for evolutionary dynamics with environmental feedback

Controlling human utilization of shared resources via taxes

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