Four Versions of Double Effect

Marquis, Donald B.

doi:10.1093/jmp/16.5.515

Cited by 37 publications

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“…It is an active principle prescribing that practical reason be intentional and directed toward an end (Grisez, 1965 Modern formulations of PDE are plentiful and much of the criticisms of PDE are bound up with the difficulty of precisely articulating the concept (Quinn, 1989). It is quite possible that a perfect formulation is yet to be developed (Marquis, 1991); however, a hybrid of the seminal contribution of Boyle (1980) and the later work of Masek (2010), Bennett (1995), Valasquez and Brady (1997) and Marquis (1991) provides a robust framework for our public policy application. Each of these authors emphasised different aspects of PDE in their work.…”

Section: Origins and Definition Of Pdementioning

confidence: 99%

Re-evaluating local government amalgamations: utility maximisation meets the principle of double effect (PDE)

Drew

Grant²,

Fisher

2017

Policy &Amp; Politics

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Public policy debates are often dominated by economic analysis of aggregate financial benefit. However, public policy formulated on this basis is frequently regarded as profoundly unsatisfactory by stakeholders. Focussing upon municipal amalgamation, this paper provides an alternative framework for public policy analysis which emphasises the importance of intent, process and uncertainty in decision making. We contend that an approach of this type better accommodates public opinion on contentious policy reform. Moreover, it reminds policy makers that even the most admirable economic outcome must still be achieved through a morally licit process.

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Section: Origins and Definition Of Pdementioning

confidence: 99%

Re-evaluating local government amalgamations: utility maximisation meets the principle of double effect (PDE)

Drew

Grant²,

Fisher

2017

Policy &Amp; Politics

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“…So the option of denying the claim that Aristotle's examples are cases of intended means on the grounds that there is no coherent working distinction between intended means and merely foreseen side-effects cannot rescue the thesis that Aristotle's examples of mixed actions are cases of double effect. 19 I shall just mention some representative major contributions to this particular stream of the debate: Foot 1967, Bennett 1980, Quinn 1989, Boyle 1991, Marquis 1991, Fischer/Ravizza/Copp 1993, McMahan 1994, McIntyre 2001, and Wedgewood 2011 have already referred to my own work on the topic).…”

Section: Journal Of Ancient Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

Aristotle and Double Effect

Nucci

2014

J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.)

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There are some interesting similarities between Aristotle's 'mixed actions' in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics and the actions often thought to be justifiable with the Doctrine of Double Effect. Here I analyse these similarities by comparing Aristotle's examples of mixed actions with standard cases from the literature on double effect such as, amongst others, strategic bombing, the trolley problem, and craniotomy. I find that, despite some common features such as the dilemmatic structure and the inevitability of a bad effect, Aristotle's mixed actions do not count as cases justifiable through application of the Doctrine of Double Effect because they fail to meet the crucial necessary condition of the Doctrine according to which the bad effect can only be a merely foreseen sideeffect and not an intended means. The Doctrine of Double Effect1 is normally traced back to Aquinas. The attribution of the Doctrine of Double Effect to Aquinas's treatment of self-defence in 1 Here I will just assume previous knowledge of the Doctrine of Double Effect, and restrict my discussion of the actual principle to this footnote with the following representative definitions: -Aquinas, which is often credited with the first explicit version of DDE: "Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention" (Summa II-II, 64, 7); -Gury: "It is licit to posit a cause which is either good or indifferent from which there follows a twofold effect, one good, there other evil, if a proportionately grave reason is present, and if the end of the agent is honourable -that is, if he does not intend the evil effect" (Boyle's translation 1980: 528); -Mangan: "A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good and a bad effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time: 1) that the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent; 2) that the good effect and not the evil effect be intended; 3) that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect; 4) that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect" (1949: 43).-McIntyre in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "sometimes it is permissible to bring about as a merely foreseen side effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible to bring about intentionally"

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“…Also appealing to an account of the nature of intention, Masek (), following Marquis (), adopts a ‘strict’ theory according to which “an effect is intended (or part of the agent's plan) if and only if the agent A has the effect as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end” (2010, 569). Applying the strict theory (which is compatible with Bratman's theory), Masek accepts that in cases such as Large Man and Craniotomy, the agent of the case does not intend that the relevant victim, large man or fetus, suffer harm or death .…”

Section: “Rejection Of the Problem” Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short

Nelkin

Rickless

2013

Nous

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According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so-called "closeness problem", that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have been taken to be paradigmatic instances in which DDE applies to intended harm. In this paper, we consider and reject a number of recent attempts to solve the closeness problem. We argue that the failure of these proposals strongly suggests that the closeness problem is intractable, and that the distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm is not morally significant. Further, we argue that there may be a deeper reason why such attempts must fail: the rationale that makes the best fit with DDE, namely, an imperative not to aim at evil, is itself irredeemably flawed. While we believe that these observations should lead us to abandon further attempts to solve the closeness problem for DDE, we also conclude by showing how a related principle that is supported by a distinct rationale and avoids facing the closeness problem altogether nevertheless shares with DDE its most important features, including an intuitive explanation of a number of cases and a commitment to the relevance of intentions.

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Four Versions of Double Effect

Cited by 37 publications

References 0 publications

Re-evaluating local government amalgamations: utility maximisation meets the principle of double effect (PDE)

Re-evaluating local government amalgamations: utility maximisation meets the principle of double effect (PDE)

Aristotle and Double Effect

So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short

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