2001
DOI: 10.1111/0447-2778.00004
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Founding Family Controlled Firms: Performance, Risk, and Value

Abstract: An agency theory framework is used to test the effects of founding family control on firm performance, capital structure, and value. Both the finance and management literatures regarding the relationship between firm control and firm value are explored. Controlling for size, industry, and managerial ownership, the results suggest that firms controlled by the founding family have greater value, are operated more efficiently, and carry less debt than other firms.

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Cited by 423 publications
(327 citation statements)
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“…In the United States, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) found that while there is no difference in leverage, listed family firms are less diversified in terms of business segments relative to non-family firms. McConaughy et al (2001) provide evidence that family firms use significantly less debt with the difference even greater with respect to the use of short-term debt. In contrast, family firms that use control enhancing mechanisms are more leveraged (King and Santor 2008) and in periods of growth, family firms use more debt capital (Schulze et al 2003).…”
Section: Proposition 6 Family Firms' Cost Of Debt Is Lower Relative mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…In the United States, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) found that while there is no difference in leverage, listed family firms are less diversified in terms of business segments relative to non-family firms. McConaughy et al (2001) provide evidence that family firms use significantly less debt with the difference even greater with respect to the use of short-term debt. In contrast, family firms that use control enhancing mechanisms are more leveraged (King and Santor 2008) and in periods of growth, family firms use more debt capital (Schulze et al 2003).…”
Section: Proposition 6 Family Firms' Cost Of Debt Is Lower Relative mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…There are some suggestions to address the topic of debt as a relevant factor for consideration [41,48], and the benefits that indebtedness may bring to family and non-family firms have been explored in the literature. The impact of periodic payments that debt frequently provokes diminishes free-cash flow and may lead to lower discretional behavior by management [49].…”
Section: Debtmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (1997) find that poorer investor protection by national legal systems is associated with smaller and more illiquid capital markets supporting the view that private finance could be vital and a scarce resource for corporate growth in these countries. In economies with immature capital markets and few professional managers, many family firms are established by obtaining capital and human investments from families and personal networks (McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001). Furthermore, through business networks, uncertainties and complexity are reduced because information is shared and circulated among the participants in the network, resulting in better monitoring of activities both within and between firms.…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Research Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%