Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 1-Key concepts and classical results

Garg, Dinesh; Narahari, Y.; Gujar, Sujit

doi:10.1007/s12046-008-0008-3

Cited by 38 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 57 publications

(39 reference statements)

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“…In terms of mechanism design, it would be interesting to explore optimal broadcast mechanisms in the Myerson sense [22], [34]. These are mechanisms that minimize the incentive budgets subject to Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality.…”

Section: B Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that this mechanism with the above payment rule is incentive compatible. This directly follows from the incentive compatibility property of the dAGVA mechanism [22], [34].…”

Section: B the Bic-b Protocolmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…To compensate the incurred cost of the routers in the network, we need to determine payments to the nodes. We follow the payment rule of the classical dAGVA mechanism or expected externality mechanism [22], [34], to compute the payments to the nodes in our scheme. Using the payment rule of the dAGVA mechanism [22], [34], ∀i ∈ N , ∀θ ∈ Θ, we get…”

Section: B the Bic-b Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes

Suri

Narahari

2008

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

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Abstract-Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol.Index Terms-Ad hoc wireless networks, incentive compatible broadcast (ICB), rationality, selfish nodes, Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B), Dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast (DSIC-B), least cost path (LCP), source rooted broadcast tree (SRBT), budget balance, individual rationality.

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Section: B Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that this mechanism with the above payment rule is incentive compatible. This directly follows from the incentive compatibility property of the dAGVA mechanism [22], [34].…”

Section: B the Bic-b Protocolmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: B the Bic-b Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes

Suri

Narahari

2008

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

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“…Several solutions have been proposed to achieve budget balance while preserving truthfulness [25,26,27]. But in our problem, budget balance per allocation is not a requirement, because what we need is long-term balance between payments and redistribution, which is a much more relaxed condition.…”

Section: Operation With Virtual Currencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks using truthful mechanisms and virtual currency

et al. 2013

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In cognitive radio networks, there are scenarios where secondary users (SUs) utilize opportunistically the spectrum originally allocated to primary users (PUs). The spectrum resources available to SUs fluctuates over time due to PUs activity, SUs mobility and competition between SUs. In order to utilize these resources efficiently spectrum sharing techniques need to be implemented. In this paper we present an approach based on game-theoretical mechanism design for dynamic spectrum sharing. Each time a channel is not been used by any PU, it is allocated to SUs by a central spectrum manager based on the valuations of the channel reported by all SUs willing to use it. When an SU detects a free channel, it estimates its capacity according to local information and sends the valuation of it to the spectrum manager. The manager calculates a conflict-free allocation by implementing a truthful mechanism. The SUs have to pay for the allocation an amount which depends on the set of valuations. The objective is not to trade with the spectrum, but to share it according to certain criteria. For this, a virtual currency is defined and therefore monetary payments are not necessary. The spectrum manager records the credit of each SU and redistributes the payments to them after each spectrum allocation. The mechanism restricts the chances of each SU to be granted the channel depending on its credit availability. This credit restriction provides an incentive to SUs to behave as benefit maximizers. If the mechanism is truthful, their best strategy is to communicate the true valuation of the channel to the manager, what makes possible to implement the desired spectrum sharing criteria. We propose and evaluate an implementation of this idea by using two simple mechanisms which are proved to be truthful, and that are tractable and approximately efficient. We show the flexibility of these approach by illustrating how these mechanisms can be modified to achieve different sharing objectives which are trade-offs between efficiency and fairness. We also investigate how the credit restriction and * Corresponding author Email addresses: jrvidal@dcom.upv.es (José R. Vidal), vpla@dcom.upv (Vicent Pla), lguijar@dcom.upv (Luis Guijarro), jmartinez@dcom.upv.es (Jorge Martinez-Bauset)1 Telephone: +34 96 3879765, Fax: +34 96 3877309

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“…They present a truthful mechanism when a node only colludes with its neighbors. [8], [9] provide a tutorial on mechanism design and attempt to apply it to concepts in engineering. [10], [11] utilize SINR and power auctions to allocate resources in a wireless scenario and present an asynchronous distributed algorithm for updating power levels and prices to characterize convergence using supermodular game theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characterization of Non-Manipulable and Pareto Optimal Resource Allocation Strategies for Interference Coupled Wireless Systems

Boche

Naik

Alpcan

2010

2010 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM

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Abstract-This paper investigates the properties of social choice functions that represent resource allocation strategies in interference coupled wireless systems. The allocated resources can be physical layer parameters such as power vectors or antenna weights. Strategy proofness and efficiency of social choice functions are used to capture the respective properties of resource allocation strategy outcomes being non-manipulable and Pareto optimal. In addition, this paper introduces and investigates the concepts of (strict) intuitive fairness and non-participation in interference coupled systems. The analysis indicates certain inherent limitations when designing strategy proof and efficient resource allocation strategies, if the intuitive fairness and nonparticipation are imposed. These restrictions are investigated in an analytical social choice function framework for interference coupled wireless systems. Among other results, it is shown that a strategy proof and efficient resource allocation strategy for interference coupled wireless systems cannot simultaneously satisfy continuity and the frequently encountered property of non-participation.

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Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 1-Key concepts and classical results

Cited by 38 publications

References 57 publications

Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes

Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes

Dynamic spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks using truthful mechanisms and virtual currency

Characterization of Non-Manipulable and Pareto Optimal Resource Allocation Strategies for Interference Coupled Wireless Systems

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