2020
DOI: 10.1007/s00145-020-09357-w
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Foundations of Fully Dynamic Group Signatures

Abstract: Group signatures allow members of a group to anonymously sign on behalf of the group. Membership is administered by a designated group manager. The group manager can also reveal the identity of a signer if and when needed to enforce accountability and deter abuse. For group signatures to be applicable in practice, they need to support fully dynamic groups, i.e., users may join and leave at any time. Existing security definitions for fully dynamic group signatures are informal, have shortcomings, and are mutual… Show more

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Cited by 26 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…In LPY papers [45,44], they extended the KY model by considering the revocation functionality (the LPY model). Recently, Bootle et al [17] pointed out that in the previous models, a user may be able to sign messages with respect to earlier time intervals during which the user was not a member of the group. Note that they also gave a countermeasure, and it is also applicable to our scheme.…”
Section: Our Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In LPY papers [45,44], they extended the KY model by considering the revocation functionality (the LPY model). Recently, Bootle et al [17] pointed out that in the previous models, a user may be able to sign messages with respect to earlier time intervals during which the user was not a member of the group. Note that they also gave a countermeasure, and it is also applicable to our scheme.…”
Section: Our Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A secure pRate scheme must possess the anonymity, rating-secrecy and unforgeability properties that were introduced informally in Section 2. In Appendix A we formalise these properties using game-based security definitions which are based on security models for group signatures [8,13]. For unforgeability, we model three different aspects: (i) advertisement-unforgeability to ensure that only users in possession of a valid reputation credential urep can create valid advertisements for their reputations scores, (ii) ratee-unforgeability to ensure that only users in possession of a valid reputation credential urep can issue rating tokens during the execution of the Token protocol that can then be used to produce ratings, (iii) rater-unforgeability to ensure that only users in possession of rating tokens issued to them by some other user can submit valid ratings for that user.…”
Section: Syntax and Security Properties Of Pratementioning
confidence: 99%
“…-The score was updated no earlier than 1 Oct 2018, i.e., t > 6848 where 6848 is the number of days elapsed from 1 Jan 2000 to 1 Oct 2018. This can be proved using t ∈ [0, 2 13 ) and t − 6848 ∈ [0, 2 13 ).…”
Section: Performance Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, we require that a signature is invalid if the corresponding signer is revoked. 8 7 Recently, Bootle et al [18] consider fully dynamic group signatures where users can join and leave at any time. They point out that previous definitions are weak in the sense that these definitions allow members who joined at recent time periods to sign messages w.r.t earlier time periods during which they were not members of the group.…”
Section: Security Definitions Of Gs-tdlmentioning
confidence: 99%