Foundations for a Social Ontology

Lukes and ‘substantive social scientific work’

“…For example, out of the totality of micro-economic processes grow unforeseen phenomena in the form of inflations, depressions, and trade cycles generally. This objection, stated by Friedman in this collection, has previously been made by Amie Thomasson (2003) and answered by Åsa Andersson (n.d.). I called these 'systematic fallouts', and Andersson calls the level of the fallouts the 'macro' level, in contrast to the 'micro' level of intentional behavior.…”

Can There Be an Artifact Theory of Law?

“…The importance of distinguishing between them lies in the fact that different types of constitutive rules apply to each of them. Under Thomasson's view of constitutive rules, concrete institutional objects are created on the basis of either a singular constitutive rule (when they are created on a token‐by‐token basis) or a universal constitutive rule (when they are created on a type basis), while abstract institutional objects are created on the basis of an existential constitutive rule (Thomasson , 280–3). A singular constitutive rule has the following form (where “S” stands for a social feature): “of a particular (preexisting) object a , we (collectively) accept ( Sa ); e.g.…”

Institutional Objects, Reductionism and Theories of Persistence

“…In many cases there does not seem to be a suitable mind‐independent X object with which the alleged institutional object can be identified. Thus, Thomasson (1997; 2003) and Smith () have pointed out that some institutional objects are ostensibly abstract , i.e., without a spatial location . And if they are abstract, they cannot be identified with brute physical objects that are spatially located.…”

“…And Thomasson upholds that entities such as laws and corporations (I take it that she is talking about corporations as legal subjects, not their employees, share holders, etc.) are abstract, not concrete, entities (Thomasson , 121; , 273) . In consequence of their criticisms, in later writings Searle (2005; 2006; 2010) has admitted that his original theory is inapplicable to such abstract institutional objects.…”

“…In this paper, I investigate the tenability and scope of the externalist, reductive view defended by John Searle in his () . I join Amie Thomasson (1997; 2003), Barry Smith () and others in arguing that, although the theory (outlined in section 2) is plausible in relation to institutional objects such as dollar bills and presidents, it runs into trouble with other kinds of institutional object. However, I show (section 3) that the problematic class of institutional objects is larger than is typically envisaged.…”