Fortifications and the “Idea” of Force in Early English East India Company Relations With India

Watson, Iain

doi:10.1093/past/88.1.70

Cited by 45 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The company was forced to petition for forgiveness as “most humble and repentant” servants of the emperor. This salutary experience meant that as late as the 1720s, when the empire was in terminal decline thanks to chronic succession struggles and uprisings, the East India Company was still wary of Mughal military power (Watson, 1980: 80).…”

Section: European Responses To Non-western Great Powers: Deference or Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Myths of military revolution: European expansion and Eurocentrism

Sharman

2017

European Journal of International Relations

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This article critiques explanations of the rise of the West in the early modern period premised on the thesis that military competition drove the development of gunpowder technology, new tactics, and the Westphalian state, innovations that enabled European trans-continental conquests. Even theories in International Relations and other fields that posit economic or social root causes of Western expansion often rely on this “military revolution” thesis as a crucial intervening variable. Yet, the factors that defined the military revolution in Europe were absent in European expeditions to Asia, Africa, and the Americas, and conventional accounts are often marred by Eurocentric biases. Given the insignificance of military innovations, Western expansion prior to the Industrial Revolution is best explained by Europeans’ ability to garner local support and allies, but especially by their deference to powerful non-Western polities.

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Section: European Responses To Non-western Great Powers: Deference or Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Myths of military revolution: European expansion and Eurocentrism

Sharman

2017

European Journal of International Relations

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show abstract

“…100 Externally, however, it was an instrument of diplomacy, oriented towards maintaining respect and the Company's rights, more directed towards establishing the threat or 'idea' of potential rather than actual violence. 101 If this was a somewhat un-Machiavellian but nonetheless humanistically sympathetic position, it was one articulated at times in the albeit superficial and digested languages of a Machiavellian psychology of power: Company stations were reminded to keep their enemies 'honest for fear of us, which is the surer and much Stronger Passion than Love'; 102 a strong garrison and a growing network of fortifications was the only way to keep the Company's opponents at bay as they 'will do more for fear then love of us'. 103 The desire to appear strong coupled with the reluctance, even at its most aggressive points, to engage in frequent, protracted, or territorial war was rooted in a typical fear of overextension, particularly when encircled by far greater and wealthier powers.…”

Section: The Company's Publicmentioning

confidence: 99%