Forms and Effects of Shareholder Activism

Chung, Huimin; Talaulicar, Till

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00806.x

Cited by 44 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The effectiveness of proxy voting as a shareholder activism mechanism Several researchers have investigated the effectiveness of institutional shareholder activism in changing corporate behaviour (Chung & Talaulicar, 2009;Wen, 2009). As researchers do not have access to data on private discussions between shareholders and investee companies, most studies on the effectiveness of shareholder activism focus on proxy voting and non-binding shareholder resolutions.…”

Section: Raisingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional proxy voting in South Africa: Process, outcomes and impact

Viviers

Smit

2015

SAJBM

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This study investigated the nature of institutional shareholder activism in South Africa with a particular focus on proxy voting as a public form of shareholder discontent. A total of 24 510 votes cast by 17 local investment management companies in 2013 were analysed. Interviews were also conducted with selected investment managers to gain more insight into the proxy voting process at their companies. Based on this data, it was concluded that investment managers preferred to engage with investee companies in private and viewed proxy voting as the last link in the shareholder activism chain. As a result, only 6.6 per cent of all votes were 'against' resolutions tabled by 347 JSE-listed companies in 2013. Resolutions regarding shareholders' endorsement of companies' remuneration policies; the election and re-election of directors, particularly those serving on audit committees; and the issuance of ordinary shares elicited the most opposition. Companies that were excluded from the JSE's Socially Responsible Investment Index in 2013 attracted significantly more opposition than their counterparts who were included in the index when seeking shareholder approval on the election and re-election of directors and the placing of shares under the control of directors. The same applied to companies that had low environmental, social and governance disclosure scores in 2013 as regards the issuance of shares. It is recommended, amongst others, that shareholder activism in South Africa be promoted by enhancing investor education and effecting some regulatory changes.

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Section: Raisingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional proxy voting in South Africa: Process, outcomes and impact

Viviers

Smit

2015

SAJBM

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“…More specifically, they could encourage organizational innovative activities in the following two ways. First, institutional investors (especially banks and public pension funds as we refer to them in this study) could monitor and discipline managers through their voice (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010; David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001). This “voice” represents a kind of political action through communication (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010; Ryan & Schneider, 2002).…”

Section: Research Model and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, institutional investors (especially banks and public pension funds as we refer to them in this study) could monitor and discipline managers through their voice (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010; David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001). This “voice” represents a kind of political action through communication (Chung & Talaulicar, 2010; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). It includes dialogue and negotiation with management (Byrne, 1999), issuing shareholder resolutions (Gillan & Starks, 2000), building shareholder coalitions, and using public media campaigns to criticize management policies.…”

Section: Research Model and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Ownership Structure Matter for Firm Technological Innovation Performance? The Case of Korean Firms

Choi

Park

Hong

2012

Corporate Governance

180

147

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Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study examines the influence of firms' ownership structure on their technological innovation performance. First, we have examined whether ownership concentration positively influences technological innovation performance. Then we have investigated the primary reasons for the results derived from the first stage of our analysis by circumstantially exploring the impacts of four different ownership types. Research Findings/Insights: Using five sets of cross‐sectional data, consisting of 301 Korean firms, we found that ownership concentration does not have a significant effect on firm technological innovation performance. However, some ownership types (e.g., institutional and foreign) do have a positive effect. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Drawing on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective, our paper is the first to consider a comprehensive treatment of the effect of ownership types on innovation in an emerging country, in particular in contrast to previous studies that have focused on advanced economies. Since only partial predictions suggested by agency and resource dependence perspectives were supported, it appears that neither theory adequately captures the ownership‐technological innovation performance relationship. Thus, we suggest that future research should explore the question through a different theoretical lens to better understand the impact of ownership types. We suggest that transaction cost economics can be another path to approach the phenomenon. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study suggests that managers should recognize how each characteristic of ownership structure (types) influences the building of firm‐specific capabilities for innovation. Policy makers and managers should be aware of the impact of the complete range of ownership types on technological innovation performance when they implement corporate governance reform with greater effectiveness. It also suggests that successful technological catch‐up and innovation not only require policies for upgrading technology capabilities, but also the setting up of a suitable supporting ownership structure that favors innovation of firms in emerging countries. We suggest that successful technological catch‐up and innovation require a supporting ownership structure.

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“…Institutional shareholders are expected to demand compliance and explanations for non-compliance. It is argued that while institutional shareholders are not there to usurp the role of monitoring agencies, they can pressurise companies to take shareholder accountability and interests more seriously (Chung and Talaulicar, 2010;Roberts et al, 2006). Roberts et al (2005;2006) find that the demand for accountability by institutional shareholders, allows for better dialogue with corporate managers on matters that are intended to create better shareholder value.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria: An accountability perspective

2016

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General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms 1 Institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria: An accountability perspective ABSTRACT Research has identified institutional shareholders and shareholders' associations as separate groups that are able to interact and promote accountability through shareholder activism. This study employs a qualitative methodology to critically evaluate how institutional shareholders perceive the participation of Nigerian shareholders' associations in shareholder activism. We examine three features of accountability that are vital in shareholder activism; dialectical activity, independence and agenda. We contribute to the accountability literature by showing how these three features shape institutional shareholders' perception of shareholders' associations as shareholder activists. Our findings show distinct differences between the views of representatives from active and passive institutional shareholders.

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Forms and Effects of Shareholder Activism

Cited by 44 publications

References 32 publications

Institutional proxy voting in South Africa: Process, outcomes and impact

Institutional proxy voting in South Africa: Process, outcomes and impact

Does Ownership Structure Matter for Firm Technological Innovation Performance? The Case of Korean Firms

Institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria: An accountability perspective

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