Abstract:There are many situations where people join groups, the number of groups is fixed, and where a person can only join a new group if the new group approves the person's joining. We examine such situations where agents are concerned with either local status (each agent wants to be the highest status agent in his group) or global status (each agent wants to join the highest status group that she can join). For both cases, conditions are provided under which a segregated stable partition of groups form where simila… Show more
“…25 For a discussion see Page (2007). 26 For an example of social or status based preferences, see Watts (2007). 27 See Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) for more discussion of such trade-offs in a risk-sharing environment.…”
Section: A Matching Processmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…29 Instead, it is governed by the relative sizes of populations, agents' preferences and the implications for their matching decisions, and feedbacks in the matching process which govern the mix of friendships that individuals are faced with forming. Two simplifications that we have made in the model are the continuous time matching and the fact that the mix of types that agents meet is deterministic.…”
We develop a model of friendship formation that sheds light on segregation patterns observed in social and economic networks. Individuals have types and see typedependent benefits from friendships. We examine the properties of a steady-state equilibrium of a matching process of friendship formation. We use the model to understand three empirical patterns of friendship formation: (i) larger groups tend to form more same-type ties and fewer other-type ties than small groups, (ii) larger groups form more ties per capita, and (iii) all groups are biased towards same-type relative to demographics, with the most extreme bias coming from middle-sized groups. We show how these empirical observations can be generated by biases in preferences and biases in meetings. We also illustrate some welfare implications of the model.
“…25 For a discussion see Page (2007). 26 For an example of social or status based preferences, see Watts (2007). 27 See Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) for more discussion of such trade-offs in a risk-sharing environment.…”
Section: A Matching Processmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…29 Instead, it is governed by the relative sizes of populations, agents' preferences and the implications for their matching decisions, and feedbacks in the matching process which govern the mix of friendships that individuals are faced with forming. Two simplifications that we have made in the model are the continuous time matching and the fact that the mix of types that agents meet is deterministic.…”
We develop a model of friendship formation that sheds light on segregation patterns observed in social and economic networks. Individuals have types and see typedependent benefits from friendships. We examine the properties of a steady-state equilibrium of a matching process of friendship formation. We use the model to understand three empirical patterns of friendship formation: (i) larger groups tend to form more same-type ties and fewer other-type ties than small groups, (ii) larger groups form more ties per capita, and (iii) all groups are biased towards same-type relative to demographics, with the most extreme bias coming from middle-sized groups. We show how these empirical observations can be generated by biases in preferences and biases in meetings. We also illustrate some welfare implications of the model.
“…More closely, our study is related to Milchtiach and Winter (2002) and Watts (2007) who also discuss segregation within a status-based preferences setting. We build upon the work of Watts (2007) in defining our notions of local and global status and the properties of segregation and integration.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 82%
“…We build upon the work of Watts (2007) in defining our notions of local and global status and the properties of segregation and integration. As in Watts (2007), our agents prefer to have a higher local status measured by their relative position in the group. While we measure the relative position as the distance from the average, she captures it by the rank of the individual in the group.…”
SummaryWe study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.
Keywords
AbstractWe study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.
“…In particular, we assume players' preferences to be based on the substitutability between local and global status that an agent attains in the corresponding coalitions (cf. [10,11]). In this framework, we show that if global status is weighted in a balanced way, then a core stable coalition structure always exists.…”
We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.
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