Formally Verifying Flow Properties in Industrial Systems

Dreier, Jannik; Puys, Maxime; Potet, Marie-Laure; Lafourcade, Pascal; Roch, Jean‐Louis

doi:10.5220/0006396500550066

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Another protocol, OPC UA, has been analysed by the authors of [207] using ProVerif finding vulnerabilities in the authentication sub-protocol. In similar fashion, the authors of [89] analysed several Modbus and OPC UA authenticity and integrity properties using TAMARIN theorem prover [178] discovering the necessity for secure channels. In [15] the authors have formally analysed the authentication properties of DNP3 protocol utilizing the CPN state space analysis tool [140]discovering a potential for replay attack.…”

Section: Industrialmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security

et al. 2022

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In today’s world, critical infrastructure is often controlled by computing systems. This introduces new risks for cyber attacks, which can compromise the security and disrupt the functionality of these systems. It is therefore necessary to build such systems with strong guarantees of resiliency against cyber attacks. One way to achieve this level of assurance is using formal verification, which provides proofs of system compliance with desired cyber security properties. The use of Formal Methods (FM) in aspects of cyber security and safety-critical systems are reviewed in this article. We split FM into the three main classes: theorem proving, model checking and lightweight FM. To allow the different uses of FM to be compared, we define a common set of terms. We further develop categories based on the type of computing system FM are applied in. Solutions in each class and category are presented, discussed, compared and summarised. We describe historical highlights and developments and present a state-of-the-art review in the area of FM in cyber security. This review is presented from the point of view of FM practitioners and researchers, commenting on the trends in each of the classes and categories. This is achieved by considering all types of FM, several types of security and safety-critical systems and by structuring the taxonomy accordingly. The article hence provides a comprehensive overview of FM and techniques available to system designers of security-critical systems, simplifying the process of choosing the right tool for the task. The article concludes by summarising the discussion of the review, focusing on best practices, challenges, general future trends and directions of research within this field.

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Section: Industrialmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security

et al. 2022

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“…We consider that the security of industrial communication protocols like OPC-UA, DNP3, and Modbus is not within the scope of this work, as they have already been analyzed [56,57,58,59].…”

Section: Sd-wan Architecture For Industrial Control Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockchain and Random Subspace Learning-Based IDS for SDN-Enabled Industrial IoT Security

Derhab

Gabsi

Gumaei

et al. 2019

Sensors

134

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The industrial control systems are facing an increasing number of sophisticated cyber attacks that can have very dangerous consequences on humans and their environments. In order to deal with these issues, novel technologies and approaches should be adopted. In this paper, we focus on the security of commands in industrial IoT against forged commands and misrouting of commands. To this end, we propose a security architecture that integrates the Blockchain and the Software-defined network (SDN) technologies. The proposed security architecture is composed of: (a) an intrusion detection system, namely RSL-KNN, which combines the Random Subspace Learning (RSL) and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) to defend against the forged commands, which target the industrial control process, and (b) a Blockchain-based Integrity Checking System (BICS), which can prevent the misrouting attack, which tampers with the OpenFlow rules of the SDN-enabled industrial IoT systems. We test the proposed security solution on an Industrial Control System Cyber attack Dataset and on an experimental platform combining software-defined networking and blockchain technologies. The evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed security solution.

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“…This paper is an extended version of a paper initially presented at SECRYPT'17 [13]. The previous version does not contain the practical experiments to validate our theoretical results.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formally and practically verifying flow properties in industrial systems

Dreier¹,

Puys²,

Potet³

et al. 2019

Computers & Security

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Industrial systems are nowadays regularly the target of cyberattacks, the most famous being Stuxnet. At the same time such systems are increasingly interconnected with other systems and insecure media such as Internet. In contrast to other IT systems, industrial systems often do not only require classical properties like data confidentiality or authentication of the communication, but have special needs due to their interaction with physical world. For example, the reordering or deletion of some commands sent to a machine can cause the system to enter an unsafe state with potentially catastrophic effects. To prevent such attacks, the integrity of the message flow is necessary. We provide a formal definition of Flow Integrity. We apply our definitions to two wellknown industrial protocols: OPC-UA and MODBUS. Using TAMARIN, a cryptographic protocol verification tool, we confirm that most of the secure modes of these protocols ensure Flow Integrity given a resilient network. However, we also identify weaknesses in a supposedly secure version of MODBUS, as well as subtleties in the handling of sequence numbers in OPC-UA. We also practically examine an OPC-UA stack named python-opcua, where some of the subtleties are not handled correctly.

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Formally Verifying Flow Properties in Industrial Systems

Cited by 6 publications

References 23 publications

A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security

A Survey of Practical Formal Methods for Security

Blockchain and Random Subspace Learning-Based IDS for SDN-Enabled Industrial IoT Security

Formally and practically verifying flow properties in industrial systems

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