2015
DOI: 10.1007/s00165-014-0315-x
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Formalizing provable anonymity in Isabelle/HOL

Abstract: We formalize in a theorem prover the notion of provable anonymity. Our formalization relies on inductive definitions of message distinguishing ability and observational equivalence on traces observed by the intruder. Our theory differs from its original proposal and essentially boils down to the inductive definition of distinguishing messages with respect to a knowledge set for the intruder. We build our theory in Isabelle/HOL to achieve a mechanical framework for the analysis of anonymity protocols. Its feasi… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Isabelle [16][17][18][19] is an auxiliary theorem prover who provides theorem proving with strong theoretical and technical support. Compared with other traditional theorem provers, the Isabelle theorem prover has the following distinguishing features.…”
Section: Isabelle Theorem Provermentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Isabelle [16][17][18][19] is an auxiliary theorem prover who provides theorem proving with strong theoretical and technical support. Compared with other traditional theorem provers, the Isabelle theorem prover has the following distinguishing features.…”
Section: Isabelle Theorem Provermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…6. Therefore the loop invariant could be defined as inv≡s=maxincome(m, P)Ù0<m≤n, which is similar to the postcondition(post≡s= maxincome(n, P) ≡invÙm=n), so the program specification could be replaced equivalently by m, s: [n>1, invÙm =n] [16] .…”
Section: Choosing the Invariantmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…eorem proving is an effective method when dealing with general systems of infinite state apace. e notion of provable anonymity theory was built in Isabelle/HOL to achieve a mechanical framework for the analysis of anonymity protocols [17,18]. Its feasibility is illustrated through two case studies of the Crowds and Onion Routing protocols.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In our work we employed a passive intruder model, and indeed several authors agree that this is enough when analyzing confidentiality requirements. For example, Li and Pang [26], and Shmatikov [15] used passive intruders to verify anonymity of protocols, a special case of confidentiality. The latter work also considers probabilistic attacks.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%