Formalisation and Verification of the GlobalPlatform Card Specification Using the B Method

Zanella-Béguelin, Santiago

doi:10.1007/11741060_9

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Since its first publication, the GP card specifications have been the subject of diverse verifications. For instance, authors in [3] examine some aspects of these specifications and prove their soundness via the B method. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no rigorous analysis of the SCP encryption schemes has been provided before.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptanalysis of GlobalPlatform Secure Channel Protocols

Sabt

Traoré

2016

Security Standardisation Research

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GlobalPlatform (GP) card specifications are the de facto standards for the industry of smart cards. Being highly sensitive, GP specifications were defined regarding stringent security requirements. In this paper, we analyze the cryptographic core of these requirements; i.e. the family of Secure Channel Protocols (SCP). Our main results are twofold. First, we demonstrate a theoretical attack against SCP02, which is the most popular protocol in the SCP family. We discuss the scope of our attack by presenting an actual scenario in which a malicious entity can exploit it in order to recover encrypted messages. Second, we investigate the security of SCP03 that was introduced as an amendment in 2009. We find that it provably satisfies strong notions of security. Of particular interest, we prove that SCP03 withstands algorithm substitution attacks (ASAs) defined by Bellare et al. that may lead to secret mass surveillance. Our findings highlight the great value of the paradigm of provable security for standards and certification, since unlike extensive evaluation, it formally guarantees the absence of security flaws.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%