Formal Verification: Focused on the Verification Using a Plant Model

Galvão, Joel; Oliveira, Cedrico; Lopes, Helena; Tiainen, Laura

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-91334-6_18

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…However, it's worth noting that actual runtime traces could potentially be contaminated or lack complete properties suitable for verification. To ensure the accuracy and comprehensiveness of domain-specific rules, previous researches [164], [198] also explored semi-automated methodologies that combined automated data mining with manual domain expertise. VetPLC [164] established safety properties through a combination of automatic data mining and event extraction, complemented by domain knowledge in formulating safety specifications.…”

Section: C) Plc Program Runtime Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security of Programmable Logic Controllers and Related Systems: Today and Tomorrow

Alsabbagh,

Langendörfer

2023

IEEE Open J. Ind. Electron. Soc.

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Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are indispensable in Critical Infrastructures (CIs) and Industrial Control Systems (ICSs). The increasing demand for enhanced cost-effectiveness and production efficiency has driven automation manufacturers to integrate PLC based applications and systems with external networks, such as Internet. Unfortunately, this connectivity has exposed systems to potential malicious attacks from motivated adversaries. Addressing this pressing issue necessitates a comprehensive summary of ongoing research related to PLCs and their related systems. This summary should classify these systems based on disclosed vulnerabilities, potential threats, and proposed security solutions, catering to both scientists and industrial engineers. While several recent surveys have reviewed and discussed PLC security and related topics, they often fell short of covering all essential aspects comprehensively. Furthermore, prior surveys tended to focus on analyzing vulnerabilities at the system level, overlooking the vulnerabilities specific to PLCs themselves. Consequently, their findings failed to effectively secure current operational systems or propose improved solutions for future PLC designs. In this paper, we bridge this research gap by providing a detailed review of all aspects concerning the security of PLCs and related systems. This includes vulnerabilities, potential attacks, security solutions including digital forensics. We aim to offer a precise analysis, addressing the shortcomings of previous studies. Finally, we conclude the paper by presenting our recommendations tailored for PLC manufacturers, researchers and engineers. We hope that these recommendations will contribute to the development of more secure PLCs in the future.

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Section: C) Plc Program Runtime Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security of Programmable Logic Controllers and Related Systems: Today and Tomorrow

Alsabbagh,

Langendörfer

2023

IEEE Open J. Ind. Electron. Soc.

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“…It helps reduce the size of the formal model to be verified through closing an IAS system through a constrained plant model [93]. A good overview of plant modeling in formal verification can be found in [94]. In [95], a workflow to specify safety-critical systems, plants, and requirements as sequential function charts is proposed.…”

Section: Formal Verificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Static Formal Methods for Building Dependable Industrial Automation Systems

Sinha

Patil

Gomes

et al. 2019

IEEE Trans. Ind. Inf.

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Industrial automation systems (IAS) need to be highly dependable; they should not merely function as expected but also do so in a reliable, safe, and secure manner. Formal methods are mathematical techniques that can greatly aid in developing dependable systems and can be used across all phases of the system development life cycle (SDLC), including requirements engineering, system design and implementation, verification and validation (testing), maintenance, and even documentation. This state-of-the-art survey reports existing formal approaches for creating more dependable IAS, focusing on static formal methods that are used before a system is completely implemented. We categorize surveyed works based on the phases of the SDLC, allowing us to identify research gaps and promising future directions for each phase.

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“…AICE Model checking solution CTL Model Checker Chemical Brinksma'00 [45] SPIN Non-real-time model checking SPIN, Promela Chemical Bauer'04 [36] ISSTAE Model checking for timed and untimed SFC Cadence SMV, Uppaal Chemical Rawlings'18 [126] JCCE Handle combined invariance and reachability symbolic model checking, Chemical Rausch'98 [125] ACC Model checking solution SMV, Petri Net Manufacturing Bonfe'03 [43] ICEFTA Compare IEC 61131 and IEC 61499 SMV Manufacturing Cengic'06 [48] ICETFA Runtime environment for IEC 61499 Supremica (automata) Manufacturing Carlsson'12 [47] TII [112] NDSS Trusted safety verification platform TEG, symbolic execution Other Mechatronic Mesli'16 [114] HMS Multiple layer verification Uppaal Other mechatronics Darvas'17 [61] PPEECS ST to represent all languages PLCverif Other mechatronics Kottler'17 [98] SoutheastCon Detect malfunctions by intruding NuSMV NuSMV Other mechatronics Vyatkin'99 [133] ICETFA Verification for IEC 61499 Petri Net, CTL Generic Rossi'00 [127] ICAM Model checking using LD Cadence SMV Generic Bender'08 [37] MDAFA Model checking to detect race condition Petri net (TPN), Tina tool Generic Biha'11 [40] ACSAC Formal semantics for IL in Coq Coq with on-delay timers Generic Wang'13 [135] ACSAC Formal semantics in BIP models BIP Generic Kuzmin'13 [99] ACCS* Construct and verify PLC programs Cadence SMV Generic Darvas'16 [59] PMS Generic model representation PLCverif Generic Bohlender'18 [42] DES Mode abstraction for impact computation SMT Generic Galvao'18 [70] HELIX Review of plant models in form verification N/A Generic Luckeneder'18 [104] SAC Adaptive Cruise Control with model checking N/A Generic Huang'19 [87] Access Formal semantics of ST applied in C, Java N/A Generic Garcia'19 [72] ICCPS Translate DC code to PLC code and vice versa Theorem prover KeYmaera X Generic Zhang'19 [143] S&P Automated safety vetting of PLC code BUILDTSEQS on TPTL Generic Lamperiere'99 [100] ECC Survey SFC and LD validation N/A Survey Frey'00 [69] ICSMC survey based on A-F-M N/A Survey Mader'00 [106] DES Classification criteria of modelling N/A Survey ...…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

SoK: Attacks on Industrial Control Logic and Formal Verification-Based Defenses

Sun¹,

Mera²,

Lu³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Control logic programs play a critical role in industrial control systems. A vulnerable control logic could lead to devastating consequences in the physical processes, as shown in Stuxnet and similar attacks. Over the years, academic and industrial researchers have investigated various fault injection and modification attacks on control logic as well as formal verification-based defenses. Although formal verification techniques have in general improved the quality of control logic programs, we find a significant gap between the academic research and the industry practices in defending against attacks on control logic. Besides, the future research directions remain unclear as to protect control logic from the ever-expanding attack surface partly caused by the increasing needs for interconnectivity.This work fills the gap by systematizing the knowledge of control logic modification attacks and the formal verificationbased defenses. Our study covers the full chain of developing and deploying control logic programs, from engineering stations to target PLC. The primary goals of the systematization are (1) to explore the evolving technology and security landscape surrounding control logic programs, (2) to investigate newly emerged attack surfaces on PLC systems and the formal verificationbased defenses, and (3) to identify the open challenges and needs that existing formal verification based-defenses failed to address. Based on the knowledge systematization, we provide a set of recommendations for both academic researchers and industry practitioners to better focus their work on countering critical and emerging threats.

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Formal Verification: Focused on the Verification Using a Plant Model

Cited by 4 publications

References 22 publications

Security of Programmable Logic Controllers and Related Systems: Today and Tomorrow

Security of Programmable Logic Controllers and Related Systems: Today and Tomorrow

A Survey of Static Formal Methods for Building Dependable Industrial Automation Systems

SoK: Attacks on Industrial Control Logic and Formal Verification-Based Defenses

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