1987
DOI: 10.1002/spe.4380170903
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Formal specification of an access control system

Abstract: SUMMARYComputing facilities networked together but controlled by different administrations pose a problem of access control. Who decides who can use what?We specify a formal model for an access control system which allows users and services from different administrations to communicate with each other, while still allowing the administrators to retain control of their own parts of the network. The model, written in the Z specification language, has been developed as the access control system for ADMIRAL, thoug… Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…In the mid-1980s, Susan left astrophysics and academia to join the GEC-Marconi Research Centre in Chelmsford. Her first computer science paper was about modelling access control of networks with different administrations linked together [15], and she later wrote a formal model of access control in the Z formal specification language [31]. She moved to Logica Cambridge in 1989, where she developed the formal specification and correctness proofs of a high-integrity compiler [21,22,36] and the Mondex electronic purse [2,29].…”
Section: Prefacementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the mid-1980s, Susan left astrophysics and academia to join the GEC-Marconi Research Centre in Chelmsford. Her first computer science paper was about modelling access control of networks with different administrations linked together [15], and she later wrote a formal model of access control in the Z formal specification language [31]. She moved to Logica Cambridge in 1989, where she developed the formal specification and correctness proofs of a high-integrity compiler [21,22,36] and the Mondex electronic purse [2,29].…”
Section: Prefacementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, the Z notation was used in the development of formal models for access-control systems for the ADMIRAL project [51]. More recently, VDM and the Prototype verification system (PVS) were used in the analysis of the requirements for an access-control system, which is part of a comprehensive security system [12].…”
Section: Example 1: Requirements For Protection Against Unauthorized mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…19 This intrinsic high level of logic programming is being exploited even when the specification is written in a specification language that is not logic. More precisely, this approach consists of animating a not executable specification language using Prolog: this is the case of the systems that implement specifications written with Petri Nets, 20 DeMarco's Structured Anal-ysis Dataflow Diagrams,, 21,22 Z, 23,24 and CSP/LOTOS. 25 Animation gives a way of querying the formal specification, increasing the designers' confidence in the code they develop.…”
Section: Logic Languages As Specification Languagesmentioning
confidence: 99%