Formal enforcement of security policies on concurrent systems

Langar, Mahjoub; Mejri, Mohamed; Adi, Kamel

doi:10.1016/j.jsc.2011.05.003

Cited by 11 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 8 publications

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“…Recently, program rewriting [14], [15], [22], [23] techniques show their promising future, since they gather advantages of previous techniques. The basic idea is to rewrite an untrusted program statically so that the new generated version respects some security requirements.…”

Section: Recent Work Of Clarkson and Schneider Introducesmentioning

confidence: 99%

FASER (Formal and Automatic Security Enforcement by Rewriting): An algebraic approach

Sui

Mejri

Sta

2012

2012 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence for Security and Defence Applications

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Recent research confirmed that program rewriting techniques are powerful mechanisms for security enforcement, since they gather advantages of both static and dynamic approaches. In a previous work, we introduced the basic ideas underlying a program rewriting approach allowing to automatically enforce a security policy on an untrusted program. In this approach, a security policy and an untrusted program are specified as two processes in an extended version of the BPA (Basic Process Algebra) and the security enforcement problem is transformed to a resolution of a linear system generated from them. The enforced version of a program "behaves" like the original one except that it will be aborted when it tries to violate the security policy.In this paper, we better formalize the approach; we prove its foundation; we endow it with a high level logic to specify security policy and we implement a prototype that shows its efficiency.

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Section: Recent Work Of Clarkson and Schneider Introducesmentioning

confidence: 99%